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THE GREATER
HIPPIAS
A
DIALOGUE
OF
PLATO
CONCERNING
THE BEAUTIFULL

L O N D O N :

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THE GREATER
HIPPIAS,
A
DIALOGUE
CONCERNING
THE BEAUTIFUL

520370
ENGLISH

T O

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

PHILIP, EARL OF *CHESTERFIELD*,

KNIGHT of the MOST NOBLE ORDER
of the *GARTER*;

THIS TRANSLATION OF THE

GREATER HIPPIAS of PLATO

Is inscribed,

With the most PROFOUND RESPECT,

by his LORDSHIP'S

most obedient

humble Servant

FLOYER SYDENHAM.

T H E
A R G U M E N T.

*T*HIS Dialogue has the Addition of Greater to its Name, HIPPIAS, in contra-distinction to Another of the Same Name, which is shorter. Concerning the Title of it, there is not any Dispute or Diversity : neither indeed can any be. For, after an Introduction of greater Length than usual, acquainting us fully with the Character of Hippias ; at the same time artfully leading to the main Subject, and preparatory likewise to that high Doctrine, which our Philosopher aims to inculcate ; the Subject of the Conversation is opened plainly in this Question, proposed by Socrates to Hippias,—“ What is The Beautifull ? ”—And the Point is debated simply and closely, without any of those collateral Disquisitions, or Digressions by the Way, with the Variety of which our Author makes the greatest Part of his Writings so entertaining. The Design of this Dialogue is by little and little to unfold the Nature of
true

true Beauty ; and gradually to conduct our Minds to the View of that Being, who is Beauty Itself ; and from whose Original Ideas, all of them essential to his Nature, is copyed every Particular Beauty. This Plato does, in the first place, by establishing Four grand Characteristic Marks of The truly Beautifull : the First of which is Universality ; all Things, which are fair, deriving their Beauty from it, and according as they more or less partake of it, in the same Proportion being Beautiful. The Second Characteristick is Supremacy ; The Universal Fair supporting always the same Dignity, and maintaining its Character of Superiority in Beauty, with whatever else it be compared, and in whatever Light beheld : so that the Beauty of every Thing, any way set in Competition with it, is found inferior. A Third Property, essentially belonging to the Universal Sovereign Beauty, and characterising it, is the Sameness of it in all Places, and at all Times. And the Fourth Essential Property, by which it is denoted, is the Immutability of it ; this unrivaled Beauty, to whose Presence there is no Bar, and of whose Being there is no Decay, abiding independant of Fancy, or of Fashion ; nor ever varying, however Things or the Circumstances of Things may change. But all these Marks are pointed out to us in a Negative Way of Reasoning, by shewing The Beautifull not to be That, which wants any of these Essential and Characteristic Property's ; in particular,

The ARGUMENT.

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particular, not to be Corporeal Beauty, whether simple, or set off with any additional Ornaments; nor to be the Assemblage of all those outward Advantages, which are vulgarly supposed to constitute a Happy Life, and seem to the Many above all things Beautiful and Good, the highest Objects therefore of Love and of Desire; such as Riches, Health, Honour, Long Life, and a surviving Offspring. The next Step, which the Philosopher advances in the Disquisition of this Supreme Beauty, is to settle Three farther Characteristicks of it, more decisive, and more declarative of its Nature. One of these is Truth or Reality; the Essence of The truly Beautifull being independant on the Senses or on Opinion, which present us only with Appearances of Things. Another Property inherent in the Nature of The Supremely Beautifull is Power and Government; that is, Power to produce Good, and Government for the Sake of producing it; Power and Government, productive of Ill, not really doing any thing, but tending rather to undo all things. The Discernment of this Property in The Sovereign Fair opens a Way to the Discovery of Another, that is, Good considered in its Source and Fountain: all the Good, which any Being enjoys, naturally flowing from this Principle, which Plato loves to contemplate most under its Character of Fair and Beautiful. All this he inculcates in a like Negative Way, by distinguishing The truly Beautifull, first, from the meer Appearance of it
founded

founded on Opinion ; next, from what in common Estimation is the Powerfull ; and lastly, from the Profitable, or probable Means of attaining Good. Having now explained the Nature of this Universal Fair, in its own Essence, copiously and clearly enough to set the Mind on thinking What it may be, the Philosopher proceeds to shew, What are the Effects of it ; What Qualitys it communicates to each Being, which any way partakes of it ; by what Part of us, and how, those Qualitys are perceived and felt ; and what is the Consequence of our having such a Perception, and such a Sense. We find then, that every Thing, whether it be the Object of outward Sense or of Intellect, having in its self any Proportion or Order, any Species of Harmony or Beauty, oweth such Form or Quality to this all-beauteous Principle : This Form or Quality is perceived only by the Mind ; which has a Faculty or Power of perceiving it, only because it partakes of the same Principle : And this Perception of Harmony, or of Beauty, is always accompanied by a Sense of Pleasure and Delight, in which consist the Enjoyment and the Happiness of Mind. All this also is represented to us by Plato in the same Negative Manner, by distinguishing The Beautifull from the Pleasant in General, and by throwing out of the Inquiry all those Species of Pleasure, which have nothing to do with Proportion or Order, nor immediately affect the Mind itself, as belonging to

another Genus or Kind of Things. In the last place, to prevent a dangerous and common Error concerning the Nature of that Divine Essence, The Beautifull, our Philosopher intimates to us, it can be Nothing which admits of Number, no Particular Being or Beings; not even One, as distinguished from any Other One; and consequently must be, in the most comprehensive Sense, Universal. From considering all these Propertys, which are proved by Plato to be necessary Attributes of The Beautifull, it comes out plainly to be nothing less than UNIVERSAL¹ FORM, INTELLIGENT AND ACTIVE; imparting Form and Beauty to All things, as being itself the Plenitude of Forms, and therefore Absolutely and Supremely Fair and Beautiful: energising every where and always with equal Efficacy; and leaving no Chaos of Things, in any Place, or at any Time, unformed or in-Disorder: giving Law to Infinitude and Wildness, and by that Law governing the Universe and every Part of it; a Law, which must be immutable and unvarying, a Law equally to All thro all Ages, because no other than its own eternal Essence, considered not as view-

ing,

¹ By This the *Platonists* mean, not Nature's outward Form, but some inward Principle in Nature, to which that outward Form is owing; a Principle, whose eternal Sameness is the Cause of that constant Similarity in General, found in the Forms of Nature, the Individuals of the several Species, thro every successive Generation: a Similarity as exact, as if they were cast in the same Mould, or stamped with the same Original Types.

ing, *but as defining the Nature of Things, disposing and ordering them* : — UNIVERSAL REASON ; — giving Bound and Measure to Things ; assigning them a certain Nature, and enduing them with certain Propertys ; and being thus the Foundation of all their Reality, the Cause of all their Power and Virtue, and the Origin of all their Good : — UNIVERSAL MIND ; — communicating, with a Sense or Taste of Order and Proportion, of Harmony and Beauty, Intellectual Delight and Happiness : branching out into Many Minds, and making them Partners of its own pure Unity, and all-comprehensive Universality ; yet still remaining in its Self intire and complete, pure and simple. — In the Order we have here described, and thro the Process we have thus distinctly, and at the same time briefly, attempted to explain, does Plato in this Dialogue lead us on to that Point, which he has always principally in View, because true Virtue, according to His Doctrine, depends on it, the Knowledge of DEITY. But since, in the Conclusion of this high Inquiry, he strongly asserts the Unity of the Divine Nature, a Tenet inconsistent with the Popular Religion at Athens ; and because in Governments merely Popular, such as the Athenian, it is unsafe to oppose Opinions, by the People held Sacred ; for this reason his Manner of Writing, tho always such as to cover his Design, and hide it from the Eyes of Any, but of Those, whom a Discipline in the Principles

ciples of his Philosophy admits into the Secret, is more covert and concealed in this Dialogue than in any Other. Socrates all the way seems only to be confuting the several false Definitions given of The Beautifull by Hippias ; and doing it too under the Character of some Other, an Imaginary Person. Beside this, our Author conceals the Importance of his Meaning still more, by a Vein of Humour and Drollery, which runs throughout the Dialogue. For the same reason, his Style here is lower than usual, often the Burlesque ; and his Metaphors or Images remote from the Subject, and much below the Dignity of it. The Introductory Part of the Dialogue is of a Piece with the Principal ; being purely Ironical ; and seeming at first Sight as if intended merely to deride the Sophists, and to expose their Love of Gain, their Polymathy or various Knowledge, of itself useless to the Prime Purposes of Life, and their total Want of that true Wisdom, whose Tendency is to make Men Good and Happy. But tho the Introduction has undoubtedly this View, it will appear, on a closer Examination, to have a farther and more immediate Reference to the Subject. For in the first place it is there shewn, that the sincere Study of Nature, and especially of the Governing Principle in Nature, Mind, must be Liberal ; because not followed by Riches or Honours, and making no Figure in the Eyes of the World : that the lower Affections are first therefore to be kept

*under, and the Heart secured on the Side of Truth. In the next place it is insinuated, that Right Reason is alone truly Law, the just Rule of Human Actions, and the true Standard of Beauty in Manners ; and that the End of Law is Public Good : that Human Institutions are to be tryed by these Tests, and owe their Authority and Validity to their Correspondence with such Divine Rule, and to their Efficacy for such Godlike End. The Prejudices of False Taste in Beauty, arising from received Rules contrary to Reason, from Popular Modes and Customs pernicious to the Publick, being thus removed ; immediately is introduced the Mention of Grammar, of Arithmetick, Musick, Geometry and Astronomy ; Sciences, which open, cultivate, and improve the Mind ; lay the Fundamental Rules of Order in every Art, and regulate the Taste of Beauty ; withdraw the Mind from Particulars, and familiarise it to the Contemplation of Things General, the Objects of Intellect ; Sciences therefore these, according to the Doctrine of Plato and his Followers, necessarily previous and introductory to sound Physicks and Metaphysicks, that is, the General Knowledge of NATURE, and of MIND. In the last Part of the Introduction, to guard against Error and destroy the Foundation of it, all the Learning of Mythology and of Antiquitys, by which the Vulgar Religion was supported, is stigmatised with the Character of old Wive's Fables.—And
thus*

thus much concerning the ² Subject and the Design of the GREATER HIPPIAS ; as also concerning the Method in which that Design is carryed on, and the Conduct of the Argument throughout the Dialogue.—The Character of its Composition is so perfectly Dramatic, that but for the Want of Fable, it might be presented on the Stage by good Comedians with great Advantage : nay, so highly Picturesque is it, in the Manners which it imitates, as to be a worthy Subject for the Pencil of any Moral Painter.—The Ancients agree in placing it among the Dialogues, by Them called Anatreptic ; a Species, answering to that, which in our Synopsis we call the Confuting. The Composition of it has, we confess, that Turn given it ; and the outward Appearance of it carries that Air. But we are in Doubt, and submit it to the Judgment of discerning Critics, whether it partakes not rather of the ³ Embarrassing or puzzling Kind. For, in the first place, tho every Thing, said by Hippias, is confuted by Socrates ; yet the Falsity of no Tenet or Doctrine, laid down by that Sophist, is here exposed. He only gives Random-Answers to the Questions proposed to him, apparently without ever having either thought Himself, or heard any Other speaking, upon the Subject. In the next place, tho it appears from the latter Part of the Dialogue,
that

² See the Synopsis, Page 17.

³ See the Synopsis, Page 10.

that there was an Audience round them ; yet we may observe that Audience composed of Persons, who were of the Intimate Acquaintance of Socrates, intirely in his own Way of Thinking, and consequently in no Danger of being mis-led by the Sophist. Lastly, in the Close of the Conversation, we find the Intention of Socrates, in disputing thus with Hippias, represented by Plato to have been no other, than to exercise his own Mind in thinking and discoursing upon his Favorite Topic, that of BEAUTY.

PER-

PERSONS OF THE DIAOGUE,

SOCRATES, HIPPIAS.

' SCENE, THE LYCÆUM.

¹ The Scene of this Dialogue is clearly the *Lycæum*, a Structure of astonishing Grandeur and Beauty, at a small Distance from the City, by the Side of the *Ilyffus*; the largest and most magnificent of those Three, built at the public Cost for the Purpose of Bathing and the Gymnic Exercises. The other Two were within the City, lying convenient for the Use of the ordinary Citizens and Men of Business. But This was the most frequented by Men of larger Fortune and more Leisure; with Many of whom *Socrates* was intimately acquainted. Hither, as we learn from *Plato's Symposium*, it was his usual Custom to resort, accompanied by his Friends, and to spend here the greatest Part of the Day. That the *Sophists*, whenever they came to *Athens*, frequented the same Place, appears from *Isocrates in Orat. Panathen.* as indeed 'tis natural to suppose; the nobler Part of the Youth being daily there assembled: for These were extremely inquisitive after Knowledge, and great Admirers of Philosophy; and the Sophists professed the teaching it, and the making, for a certain stipulated Sum of Money, any Man a Philosopher. To carry on this Business of their Profession, they were continually travelling about, like the Rhapsodists, from City to City, (ταχέως πανταχὲ γιγνόμενοι, says *Isocrates*,) wherever Philosophy and Knowledge were in Esteem; but visited *Athens* the ofteneft, where above all Places those Ornaments of the Mind were highly valued.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

HIPPIAS, the ¹ Fine, and the Wife! What a long Time it is, since last you ² touched at Athens!

HIPPIAS.

¹ *Hippias* was remarkable for the Finery of his Apparel, as we shall see farther on. This, striking the Eyes of *Socrates* immediately on meeting him, occasioned his addressing him first with This Epithet: As to the Other, here given him, see Note 9.

² *Socrates* in this Sentence humorously makes Use of a Sea-Term, to represent the Life led by the Sophists, as resembling that of Mariners; who are roving incessantly from Port to Port, and never continue long in one Place. But possibly there is a farther Meaning; it may be intended to prepare us for observing that Instability of *Hippias* himself, his Notions and Opinions, which is afterwards to appear throughout the Dialogue; an Instability, arising from his Want of the fixed Principles of Science, the only sure Foundation of settled Opinions. *Horace* on the same Subject uses the same Metaphor,

Quo me cunque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes.

Hor. Epist. I. 1. v. 15.

To express the full Sense of which, we have thus paraphrased it,

*My steerless Vessel sails before the Wind;
Till where the Tempest drives, some Port I find;
Some temporary Harbour; till again
Restless I venture out into the Main.*

HIPPIAS.

³ 'Tis because I have not had Leisure, Socrates. For the Eleans, you are to know, whenever they have any Public Affairs to negotiate with any of the neighbouring ⁴ Citys,

con-

So likewise *M. Antoninus*, in many Places, particularly L. 12. §. 22. At the same time, there is a Propriety in this Expression from the Mouth of an *Athenian*, to whom it must have been habitual; *Athens* being seated near the Sea, the *Athenians* the Principal Merchants, and their State the greatest Maritime Power then in the World.

³ *Plato* acquaints us always as soon as possible with the Character of his Speakers. In this first Speech of *Hippias*, the vain and ostentatious *Sophist*, the solemn and formal *Orator*, Both appear in a strong Light, and prepare us at once for all which is to follow, agreeable to those Characters.

⁴ By Citys here, as almost every where else in *Plato*, are meant *Civil States*. For *Greece* was divided into many such, all free and independant: and the Capital City of each, being strongly fortified, was the Residence of the Chief Magistracy, and the Centre of Power: in the Name of This naturally therefore was included the whole dependant District. The Citys, particularly meant in this Place, are those of the *Peloponnesus*. For the several States, which composed this Part of *Greece*, were divided either in their Interests or Affections between the two Principal and Rival Powers, those of *Athens* and *Sparta*; who in the Time of *Socrates* were engaged in a long War one with the other. Most of the lesser States joined themselves to the *Spartans*: that of *Argos*, one of the most considerable, with a few Others, supported the *Athenians*: whilst the *Eleans* not only chose to continue Neutral, but by their Embassadors, sent to all the States concerned, laboured to restore a General Peace. And when they were at length forced into the War, took the first Opportunity, given them by a Pretence of Ill Usage from the Party which they adhered to, the *Lacedæmonian* or *Spartan*, to return to their Neutrality. Thus we see, what were the Objects of the Negotiations, in which *Hippias* had been engaged; first, a Peace between the contending Powers; or if That could not be effected, then,

constantly apply to Me, and appoint Me their Ambassador for that Purpose, in Preference to all Others: because they consider Me as a Person the Ablest to form a right Judgment of what is argued and alleged by every One of the Citys, and to make a proper Report of it to Them. ⁵ My Embassys therefore have been frequent to Many of those Powers; but ofteneft, and upon Points the most in Number, as well as of the highest Importance, have I gone to Sparta to treat with the Lacedæmonians. This is the Reason then, in Answer to Your Question, why so seldom I visit These Parts.

SOCRATES.

This it is, Hippias, to be a Man truly wise and perfectly accomplished. For, being thus qualified, you have, in your ⁶ Private Capacity, great Presents made you by the Young Men

the Maintenance of their own Neutrality. And farther, a Thing more worthy our Curiosity when we are reading *Plato*, this short View of the State of Affairs among the *Grecians*, in that Age, will help us in ascertaining the Time of the Conversation, here related, between *Socrates* and *Hippias*. But for this Inquiry we refer to our *Dissertation on the Order of the Dialogues*, where we have endeavoured to settle with some Degree of Exactness the Date of them all.

⁵ See *Philostat.* p. 495. Ed. Olear.

⁶ *Hippias* is here represented, as being both a *Sophist* and an *Orator*. For the better apprehending this double Character of his, and the more fully understanding those many Passages of *Plato*, where these Professions are mentioned, it may be useful to give a summary Account of their Rise and Nature. The *Grecian* Wisdom then, or *Philosophy*, in the most ancient Times, of which any Records are left us, included
Physicks,

Men of the Age; and are able to make them ample Amends by the greater Advantages, which They derive from you : then, in your ⁶ Public Character, you are able to do
Service

Phyicks, Ethicks, and Politicks, until the Time of *Thales* the *Ionian*; who giving himself up wholly to the Study of *Nature*, of her *Principles* and *Elements*, with the *Causes* of the several *Phænomena*, became famous above all the ancient Sages for *Natural Knowledge*; and led the Way to a Succession of Philosophers, from their Founder and first Master called *Ionie*. Addicted thus to the Contemplation of Things remote from the Affairs of Men, These all lived abstracted as much as possible from Human Society; revealing the Secrets of Nature only to a few select Disciples, who sought them out in their Retreat, and had a Genius for the same abstruse Inquiries, together with a Taste for the same retired Kind of Life. As the Fame of their Wisdom spread, the Curiosity of that whole Inquisitive Nation, the *Grecians*, was at length excited. This gave Occasion to the Rise of a new Profession or Sect, very different from that of those *speculative Sages*. A Set of Men, smitten, not with the Love of Wisdom, but of Fame and Glory, Men of great natural Abilities, notable Industry and Boldness, appeared in *Greece*; and assuming the Name of *Sophists*, a Name hitherto highly honourable, and given only to Those, by whom Mankind in General were supposed to be made wiser, to their ancient Poets, Legislators, and the Gods themselves, (see our Notes on the *Minos*;) undertook to teach, by a few Lessons and in a short Time, all the Parts of Philosophy to any Person, of whatever Kind were his Disposition or Turn of Mind, and of whatever Degree the Capacity of it, so that he was but able to pay largely for his Teaching. In the same Age with *Thales* lived *Solon* the *Athenian*; who took the other Part of Philosophy to cultivate; and applying himself chiefly to *Moral* and *Political* Science, became so great a Proficient in those Studies, that he gave a new System of excellent Laws to his Country. Hence arose in *Athens* a Race of *Politicians*, studious of the Laws, and of the Art of *Government*. During this Succession, thro Force of natural Genius, Good Polity, Commerce and Riches among the
C 2 *Athenians*,

Service to your Country ; as a Man ⁷ ought, who would
raise himself above Contempt, and acquire Reputation
among

Athenians, great Improvements were made in all the Liberal Arts : but that of *Oratory* flourished above the rest, for this Reason ; because the *Athenians* lived under a Popular Government, where the Art of Ruling is only by Persuasion. Eloquence then being one of the principal Means of Persuasion, and Persuasion the only Way to acquire and maintain Power, All, who were ambitious of any Magistracy or Office in the Government, studied to become eloquent Orators ; and the Arts of Rhetorick and Polity were thus united in the same Persons. Accordingly we learn from the Attic Writers of those Days, that the most popular *Orators* at *Athens* were appointed to Embassys, to Magistracys, to the Command of Armys, and the Supreme Administration of all Civil Affairs. See particularly *Isocrates* in *Orat. de Pace, & Panathen.* In this Dialogue we find, that the same Spirit prevailed at *Elis*. Now in Men of great Abilitys the predominant Passion is Ambition, more frequently than Avarice. Those of the *Sophists* therefore, who excelled in Quickness of Understanding, Compass of Knowledge, and Ingenuity, such as *Hippias* was, added to their other Attainments the Arts of *Popular Oratory*, and by that Means got into the Management of the State. Thus much for the present : the Sequel and the Supplement of this short History, so far as they are necessary to our Purpose, will appear on fit Occasions.

⁷ *Socrates* here unfolds the true Motives on which *Hippias* acted, in his usual sly and artful Manner ; doing always like *Horace*,

*Omne vaser vitium ridenti Flaccus amico
Tangit, & admissus circum praeccordia ludit.*

Perf. Sat. 1. §. 116.

*With Touch so fine, so tender of his Friend,
He handles every Fault which he would mend,
That the pleas'd Patient with a Smile endures
The playful Hand, which tickles while it cures.*

Equally

among the Multitude. But, Hippias, what sort of Reason can be given, why Those in former Days, who are so highly famed for Wisdom, Pittacus, and Bias, and ⁸ Thales the Mile-

Equally delicate and polite is the Satyr of *Socrates*; but with this Difference, that the Philosopher having to do with Sophists, whom he knew senseless to their Faults and incorrigible, drew the Smile rather from his Audience.

⁸ Οἱ ἀμφὶ Θαλῆν. *Ficinus*, *Grynæus*, and *Bembo* take these Words to mean Those who lived in the Time of *Thales*, that is, the famous contemporary *Seven*, upon whom *Greece* had of old bestowed the Surname of *Wise*; of which Number were *Pittacus* and *Bias*. But whoever reads in *Plutarch*, (*Vit. Solon.*) that all These, except *Thales*, acquired that Honour ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, from their Political Abilities; or has learnt from *Plutarch*'s other Treatises, and from *Laertius*, that Three of them were *Kings*, One a *Legislator*, Another one of the *Ephori* or supreme Magistrates in *Sparta*, and that a Sixth had a principal Share in the *Public Counsels* of his Country, must see, that either *Plato* is much mistaken Himself, or his Meaning mistaken by those Translators. *Cornarius*, *Serranus*, and the Translator of this Dialogue into *French*, *Monf. Maucroy*, understand this Phrase to signify only *Thales*. The modern Lexicographers indeed tell us, that the Words οἱ ἀμφὶ, before the Name of any Person, usually mean that very Person only himself: which is as much as to say, that usually they are of no Force, and signify just nothing at all. The common *Scholia* on *Homer* (*Iliad*. L. 3. v. 146.) seem to have first occasioned that Error. But we cannot find, that either there, or any where in the earliest and best *Greek* Writings, such an Expression is used, unless to signify *Many*, of which the Person mentioned is the *Principal*, and the nameless rest, οἱ ἀμφὶ, are either his *Attendants*, *Followers*, *Adherents*, or subordinate *Associates*. It may suffice to produce One Instance from *Plato* himself, in his *Protagoras*, pag. 316. where τὸς ἀμφὶ τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον is rightly translated by *Ficinus* and *Serranus* Both, as meaning not only *Orpheus* and *Museus*, but their Disciples likewise and Followers. As to those

Seven

Mileſian, with his Diſciples, Succeſſors and Followers, down to Anaxagoras, if not All, yet Moſt of them, are found to have lived the Lives of Private Men, declining to engage in Public Affairs?

HIPPIAS.

What other Reaſon, Socrates, can you imagine beſide This, that they had not a ſufficient Reach of Prudence, for the Conduct of their own Private Affairs, and thoſe of the Public, at the ſame Time?

SOCRATES.

Tell me then in the Name of Jove, whether, as all other Arts are improved, and the Workmen of former Times are contemptible and mean in Compariſon with Ours, ſhall we ſay that Your Art, that of the Sophiſts, hath in like manner received Improvement; and that Such of the Ancients, as applied themſelves to the Study of Wiſdom, were Nothing, compared to ⁹ You of the Preſent Age?

HIPPIAS.

Seven Sages, we refer to our Notes on the *Protagoras*, where they are enumerated by *Plato*, in a Liſt ſomewhat different from That given us by the Generality of Writers.

⁹ The firſt and greateſt of the Sophiſts, thoſe mentioned in this Dialogue, had, before they embarked in their new Profeſſion, been Diſciples of ſome of the Philoſophers; but with no other View, it ſeems, than ſuch as the Learners of inferior Arts have, to acquire the Means of making their Fortunes. They ſoon forſook therefore the Purſuit of Wiſdom for that of Wealth and Power, and began teaching and diſpenſing their Knowledge to Others, before they had laid in a ſufficient Stock, and without any ſettled Principles as a Fund for a continual Supply. Yet, till *Socrates* had thoroughly expoſed them, they had

HIPPIAS.

Perfectly right : that is the very Case.

SOCRATES.

So that were Bias to be restored to Life again in Our Days, he would be liable to Ridiculè, appearing in Competition with You Sophists : Your Case being parallel to that of our modern Statuaries, who tell us, that Dædalus, were He alive, and to execute such Works as those, to which he owed his great Name, would but expose himself, and become ridiculous.

HIPPIAS.

The Truth of the Matter, Socrates, exactly is what you say. I my Self, however, make it my Custom to bestow my Commendations rather upon the Ancients, and upon all Such, as flourished in Times precedent to our own ; giving
Them

had the Address to be taken for *Wise Men* and *Great Philosophers*. *Hippias*, in particular, was by all the *Grecians* honoured with the Sur-name of *Wise* ; as we learn from *Pausanias*, p. 443. Ed. *Kuhn*. who is rightly understood in this Sense by *Cresollus*, *Theat. Rhet.* p. 36. Accordingly in *Plato's Protagoras* he is called Ἰππίας ὁ σοφὸς, *Hippias the Wise*. On this Account it is, that *Socrates*, in his first Salute, addresses him with that Title ; the Ironical Flattery of which would have been too gross, had not the Ears of *Hippias* been familiarised to such a Compliment. *Suidas* (in ipsâ voce) calls him a *Philosopher* as well as *Sophist* ; and informs us, that he had been the Disciple of *Hegefidamus* ; concerning whom, and the Philosophy which he taught, not to repeat needlessly the same Thing twice, we refer to our Notes on the *Lesser Hippias*.

Them the Pre-eminence and ¹⁰Precedence above our Selves; in order to escape the Envy of the Living, and for Fear of incurring the ¹¹Resentment of the Dead.

SOCRATES.

¹⁰ Ad-literations, Ad-nominations, and Repetitions of the same Word, were some of those Prettinesses of Style, or Graces where they are employed with Judgment, which are said to have been invented by the Rhetorical Sophists. *Plato* therefore frequently in his Dialogues, with great Propriety, puts them into the Mouths of Such Speakers. On what Occasions, and how differently from the Use made of them by those Sophistical Orators, he introduces them into his own Style at other Times, will be observed elsewhere.

¹¹ There was a Law at *Athens*, the Author of which was *Solon*, ordaining μή λέγειν κακῶς τὸν τεθνηκότα, *not to revile the Dead*: a Law made, says *Plutarch*, partly from a Political Consideration, to hinder the perpetuating of Enmitys; partly from a Motive of Justice, which forbids the attacking Those, who are not in a Capacity of defending themselves; and partly from a Principle of Religion, agreeably to which the Departed are to be looked on as Sacred: καὶ ὅσιον τὰς μεθεστώτας ἱερὰς νομίζειν. *Plut. in Vit. Solon.* p. 89. E. That this Sentiment was of much earlier Antiquity than the Age of *Solon*, appears from the following Passage of *Archilochus*, cited by *Clemens Alex.* Strom. L. 6. p. 619. Ed. Sylburg.

Οὐ γὰρ (inf. f. τὰδ') ἐσθλὰ, κατθανέσι κερτομεῖν
Ἐπ' ἀνδράσι. —

*For this is Evil, with Heart-biting Taunt
To persecute Men dead. —*

And from this of *Homer* still earlier,

Οὐκ ὅσιον φθιμένοισιν ἐπ' ἀνδράσιν εὐχετάσθαι.

Odyss. L. 22. ὅ. 412.

*With boastful Speech to glory o'er the Dead,
Is impious. —*

SOCRATES.

In My Opinion, Hippias, you see the Matter in a just Light, and consider it thoroughly well. I my Self can witness the Truth of what you say. It is indeed certain, that your Art is in This Respect really improved, in that you are able to manage the Concerns of the Publick, and at the same time give Attention to your own Private Interests. ¹² For Gorgias, that great Sophist of Leontium,

This Piece of ancient Religion arose partly from an Opinion, that Souls, freed from their Earthly Bodys, were in a State of Being superiour to that of Mortals, and ought therefore to be honoured by them; and partly was owing to a Belief, that the shadowy Ghosts, or Spirits, (which they distinguished from the Intellectual Souls) of dead Persons had it in their Power to hurt the Living, by haunting and disturbing them at least, if no other way. 'Tis on the Foundation of this Belief, that *Virgil* represents *Dido* thus threatening *Æneas*,

Omni bus umbra locis adero : dabis, improbe, pœnas.

Æneid. L. 4. v. 386.

Be where thou wilt, My Shade shall still be there :

Yes ; thou shalt suffer for thy Cruelty,

Base Man ! —

And hence likewise came to be instituted the Religious Rite of offering *θελκτήρια*, Pacificatory Sacrifices, to the Ghosts of Those, whom they were afraid of having offended. See *Eurip. Iphigen. in Taur.* v. 166.

¹² The Character of *Gorgias* is painted by *Plato* at full Length in a Dialogue inscribed with His Name. 'Twill be sufficient for our present Purpose to observe, that *Gorgias* was by Profession, like *Hippias*, an *Orator*, as well as *Sophist* ; and set up for teaching both *Philosophy* and the

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Art

ontium, came hither on a Public Embassy from his Country, as the Ablest Man among the Leontines to negotiate their Affairs of State : and here he acquired Glory by his fine Harangues in the Assembly of the People ; at the same time that by his ¹³ Exhibitions before Private Companys, and

Art of *Rhetorick* : and that the Price of his Teaching was 100 *Mnaĩ*, which is of our Money 322*l.* 18*s.* 4*d.* from each of his Scholars.

¹³ The Profession or Business of a *Sophist* consisted of *Three Branches* : One of which was to perfect and accomplish the Fine Gentleman, according to the Idea which the *Grecians* had of such a Character in that Age of Sophism : not to form him from the first Rudiments throughout, or in any Part ; for This Task they thought beneath them : but after a Course of Liberal Education had been gone thro, and the Studys and Exercises of Youth were ended, to give him then the finishing Touches ; qualifying him to speak plausibly upon all Subjects, to support with specious Arguments either Side of any Question or Debate, and by false Oratory and fallacious Reasoning, afterwards from Them called Sophistical, to corrupt the Hearers, silence the Opposers, and govern All in all Things. To attain these admired Accomplishments, the young Gentleman was constantly to attend, and follow them every where, as long as he thought fit Himself ; observing in what Manner They disputed *de Quolibet Ente*, on any Point which offered ; and learning by degrees to imitate them. Hence that, which we translate *Tuition* or *Teaching*, is every where in *Plato* termed *συνεῖναι τοῖς νέοις*, *the being accompanied by the Young Men*. Another Part of the Sophist's Occupation, quite distinct from the former, tho carried on at the same Time, was to read Lectures at a certain Price to each Auditor, before as Many as they could procure beforehand to become Subscribers to them. These Lectures, the Subjects of which were chosen indifferently, were in the Way of Declamations, Dissertations, or what we commonly call Essays, ready composed and written down. They were not contrived, however, for the Purpose of Teaching or Instruction : nor could they indeed effectually serve that End ; for long Speeches and Lectures are easily for-

and his teaching our Young Men, he collected and raised very considerable Sums of Money from this City. Or if you would have another Instance, there is ¹⁴ my own Friend, the famous Prodicus; who has frequently been sent hither on several Public Embassys: but the last Time, not long since, when he came as Ambassador from Ceos, his Speeches before the Council gained him great Honour; and his Private Exhibitions in the mean time, together with the Tuition of our Young Men, procured him an immense Heap of Money. But not One of those Ancient Sages ever thought proper to exact Money by way of Fee or Reward for his Teaching; or ever took it into his Head to display his Wisdom before a mixt Multitude. So simple were They; and so

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much

got: but they were calculated merely for Entertainment and Ostentation; and properly enough therefore entitled by the Sophists themselves ἐπιδείξεις, *Exhibitions*. The Third Branch of their Trade, the only one cultivated gratuitously, for the Sake of Fame, tho probably with a View, besides, of gaining Customers in those other the lucrative Branches, was to answer all Questions proposed to them; like the ancient Oracle at *Delphi*, or the Authors of the *Athenian* Oracle in the last Age. Allusions to which Practice of theirs we shall meet with frequently in *Plato*. But in This Passage he had Occasion only to mention their other two Employments, from which immediately accrued their Gain.

¹⁴ In *Prodicus* also were united the two Characters of *Orator* and *Sophist*: as *Philostratus* (in *Vit. Sophist.*) confirms. That *Socrates* condescended to attend his Lectures, and contracted an Intimacy with him, we learn from several of *Plato's* Dialogues. The Price paid by Each of his Auditors at those last Exhibitions of his, here mentioned, was 50 δραχμαί, or 1*l.* 12*s.* 3*½d.* See *Plat.* in *Cratyl.* p. 384. and *Aristot.* *Rhet.* L. 3. C. 14.

much a Secret was it to Them, how valuable a Thing was Money. Whereas Each of the Others, whom I mentioned, has made more Money of his Wisdom, than ¹⁵ any Other Artificer could ever earn from any Art whatever: and prior to These, ¹⁶ Protagoras did the same.

HIPPAS.

You know nothing, Socrates, of what high Advantages belong to Our Profession. If you knew but how great have been my own Gains, you would be amazed. To give you only One Instance: Going upon a certain Time to Sicily, where Protagoras then resided, high in Reputation and reverend in Years; I, tho at that time in Age greatly his inferior, gained in a very short Time more than ¹⁷ a hundred and fifty Minas: nay, from One Place only, and that a very little one, Inycum, I took above ¹⁸ twenty. This when I brought

¹⁵ ἄλλος δημιουργός. The Reason, why *Plato* uses this Word, rather than τεχνικός, his usual Term for *Artist*, will appear in his Dialogue named the *Sophist*; where he debases that Profession below the Rank of the meanest Artificer in any useful or honest Way.

¹⁶ *Protagoras* and his Doctrine make so shining a Figure in the Works of *Plato*, that, referring our Readers to Them for the Character of this Sophist, we shall only here observe, that He was the First who made his Disciples pay so dearly for his Company, and set that extravagant Price upon his Teaching, mentioned in Note 12. which became a Precedent to *Gorgias* and the other Sophists of the First Rank. For This many Authoritys may be seen, collected by *Cresollus* in *Theat. Rhet.* p. 457. and some by *Menage* in *Not. ad Laert.* p. 420. b.

¹⁷ Equal to 484*l.* 7*s.* 6*d.* *English* Money.

¹⁸ Equal to 64*l.* 11*s.* 8*d.* In all our Calculations we have followed the usual Way of Computing; in which an Ounce of the Silver Coin

brought home with me, and presented to my Father, it struck Him and my other Friends in the City with Wonder and Astonishment. To say the Truth, I am inclined to think, that not any Two of the Sophists, name which you please, taken together, have acquired so much Money as my Self.

SOCRATES.

A fair and a notable Evidence have you produced, Hippias, proving not only your own Wisdom, but how wise the World too is become now a days; and what Difference there is between the Modern Wisdom and the Ancient in Point of Excellence. ¹⁹ For of those Predecessors of yours there is reported great Folly, according to Your Account of Things. To Anaxagoras, for Instance, it is said, happened the Contrary of that lucky Fate, which befel You. For when Great Wealth had been left him, He through Negligence, they say, lost it All:
so

Coin of *Athens* is valued but at 5s. 2d. and the *Attic* δραχμή is supposed equal to the *Roman* Denarius; tho, as Dr. *Arbutnot* judiciously observes, there is Reason to think it was of greater Value.

¹⁹ τῶν γὰρ προτέρων περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου. In our Translation we have omitted this last Word; apprehending it to have been at first one of those, so frequently of old written on the Margin of Books by way of Explanation or Illustration, and so frequently, when those Books came to be copied afterward, assumed into the Text. For, if permitted to remain, it confounds or much disturbs the Construction; and so greatly puzzled the old Translators, that they have severally given this Passage four different Meanings, all of them, compared with what follows, evidently spoiling the Sense. We should chuse therefore to read τῶν γὰρ προτέρων περὶ, λέγεται κ. τ. λ.

so silly was He with his Wisdom. And of other Ancient Sages they relate Storys of the same Kind. A clear Proof I think therefore, This which you exhibit, in what a wise Age we live ; and what Disproportion the Wisdom of it bears to that of former Times. Many too, I know, are
 agreed

That this is absolutely Ironical, we should have presumed Nobody needed to be told ; had not Mr. Stanley said, in his *History of Philosophy*, that “ *Plato derides Anaxagoras for quitting his Estate ;*” and in the Margin for Proof cited this Dialogue. His taking *Plato* in this Sense is the more surprising, because he had just before told us, that *Anaxagoras* was “ *Eminent for his noble Birth and wealthy Fortunes, but more for his magnanimous Contempt of them :*” unless he imagined that *Plato* had so little of the same *magnanimous Contempt*, as to aim at making it a Subject of Derision. To judge thus, or to attribute to *Plato* such a Meaning, one would imagine belonged only to an *Athenæus*, or a *Lucian*. The Philosopher is plainly deriding the Avarice of the *Sophists* ; and to expose it the more, sets it in Contrast with the opposite Disposition of Mind in *Anaxagoras*. Had the *Conduct* indeed of this latter been the Point in Question, neither *Socrates* nor *Plato*, 'tis true, would have applauded it : for They to their *Wisdom* added *Prudence* : but in no Case were they capable of ridiculing the Highest Attainments, because unattended by those, which were in Their Opinion, tho more necessary to *Man*, yet of inferior Dignity in *Nature*. That such was their Opinion, appears from *Aristotle*, in *Ethic. Nicom.* L. 6. C. 7, 8. or *Ethic. Eudem.* L. 5. C. 7. where he treats of this very Subject with reference expressly to *Anaxagoras* and *Thales* : for that *Aristotle's* Way of Thinking, as to this Point, agreed with *Plato's*, never has been questioned. See likewise *Plato de Leg.* L. 5. pag. 743. Before we finish this Note, we are desirous to prevent an Objection, which may arise in Favour of Mr. Stanley's Mistake, from a Passage in *Mauclroy's* Translation, a little before this, where those Ancient Sages are spoken of all together. We assure the Readers then of that Translation, 'tis without the least Warrant from the Original, that the *Frenchman* has there been pleased to call them “ *les prétendus Sages.*”

agreed in This Opinion, ²¹ that a Wise Man ought, in the first place, to be wise to Himself. Now the Standard of this Kind of Wisdom is, it seems, He who can get the most Money.—But so much for This. And now tell me, as to your own Gains, from which of the Cities, whither you have travelled, did you collect the largest Sums. Undoubtedly it must have been from Sparta, whither you have gone the oftener.

HIPPIAS.

Not from thence, Socrates, by Jove.

SOCRATES.

How say you? What, the least Sum from thence?

HIPPIAS.

Never any thing at all.

SOCRATES.

'Tis a Prodigy what you relate: and I am amazed at it, Hippias. But tell me, as to that Wisdom of yours, has it

²¹ *Socrates* throughout this Speech expresses himself with a subtle Ambiguity full of Humour, and not with such a palpable and flat Irony, as all the former Translators grossly imagined. But most remarkably is he thus ambiguous in this Place: where his secret Meaning, tho he knew *Hippias* would mistake it, is to commend true Prudence; from which, says *Aristotle*, a Man seeks τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, *his own Good*, or *that which is Good with peculiar Reference to Himself*. *Eth. Nicom.* L. 6. C. 9. Consequently, the Conduct of *Anaxagoras* is here tacitly condemned. 'Tis highly probable, that *Plato* purposely inserted this Passage in the Close of the first Part of his Introduction; to prevent being misunderstood; and thinking it seasonable, at the Time when he was deriding Avarice, before he finished, to guard against the Opposite Extream.

it not the Power to improve in Virtuous Excellence all your Followers, who are conversant with it, and will learn?

HIPPIAS.

In the highest Degree, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Were you able then to improve the Sons of the Inycians, yet wanted such Ability with regard to the Sons of Sparta?

HIPPIAS.

Far from it.

SOCRATES.

The Sicilians then, I warrant, have a Desire of Virtuous Improvement; but the Spartans, not so.

HIPPIAS.

Strongly so, Socrates, have the Spartans.

SOCRATES.

Was their Want of Money then the Reason, why they followed you not?

HIPPIAS.

By no Means; for of Money they have Plenty.

SOCRATES.

What Account then can be given, in such a Case as This, when They were desirous of Improvement, and in no Want of Money to purchase it; and You able to furnish them with the highest Degrees of it; why they did not send you away loaded with Riches? What; certainly the Reason of it cannot be This, that the Spartans can educate their Sons in a better Manner than
You

You could educate them. Or shall we say they can? and do You admit this to be true?

HIPPIAS.

By no Means in the World.

SOCRATES.

Were you not able then to persuade the Young Men at Sparta, that by the Help of Your Conversation they might make greater Advances in Virtue, than ever they could hope to do from the Company and Converse of their Fathers? Or could you not persuade those Fathers, that they would do better to commit the Instruction of their Sons to Your Management, than to undertake that Care Themselves, if they had any affectionate Regard for their Offspring? For it could not be that they envy'd their Children the Attainment of the Highest Excellence in Virtue.

HIPPIAS.

I have no Suspicion of their envying them such an Attainment.

SOCRATES.

Well now; and Sparta is really governed by Good Laws.

HIPPIAS.

Who makes a Doubt of it?

SOCRATES.

Very well; and in Citys governed by Good Laws the highest Value is set on Virtue.

HIPPIAS.

Certainly.

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SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

And how to teach Virtue to Others You know best of All Men.

HIPPIAS.

By much, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Now the Man, who knows best how to teach and impart to Others the Art of Horsemanship, of all Countrys in Greece would not such a Man meet with most Honour, and acquire most Wealth, in ²² Thessaly, and wherever else this Art was cultivated most?

HIPPIAS.

'Tis probable he would.

SOCRATES.

And will not the Man, who is capable of delivering the most valuable Instructions with regard to Virtue, meet with most Honour, and pick up most Money too, if he be That way inclined, in Sparta, and every other Grecian City governed by good Laws? But in ²³ Sicily, my Friend, rather do you suppose, or at Inycum? Ought we, Hippias, to give Credit to this? for if You say it, we must believe.

HIPPIAS.

²² See the Beginning of *Plato's Meno*.

²³ The *Sicilians* were as infamous for *Luxury*, as the *Spartans* were illustrious for *Virtue*. Whence the *Greek Proverb*, Σικελικὴ τράπεζα, and the Latin, *Siculae dapies*.

HIPP IAS.

The Truth is, Socrates, that the Spartans hold it ²⁴ Sacred to make no Innovation in their Laws ; and to educate their Youth in no other Way, than what is agreeable to their ²⁵ Ancient Ufages.

SOCRATES.

How fay you ? do the Spartans hold it Sacred, not to do what is right, but to do the Contrary ?

HIPP IAS.

I would not fay any fuch thing, not I, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Would not they do right then to educate their Sons in the Better Way, and not in the Worfe ?

HIPP IAS.

'Tis true, they would : but the Laws do not permit them to have their Youth educated by ²⁶ Foreigners, or after

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²⁴ This Sacred Authority, which the *Spartans* attributed to the Laws of their Country, was owing partly to the Sanction given to thofe Laws by the *Delphian Oracle* ; as appears from *Xenophon's* fhort Observations upon the *Lacedæmonian Polity* ; and partly to the Sanction of an *Oath* taken by their Anceftors, thro a Stratagem of *Lycurgus*, to maintain his Laws inviolable : for which fee *Plutarch's* Life of that Legiflator, towards the End.

²⁵ The Manner of the *Spartan Education* may be feen at large in *Cragius de Repub. Lacedæm.* Lib. 3.

²⁶ The *Spartans*, above all People being attached to the ancient Conftitution of their Government and Laws, were extreamly jealous of having a *Taft* introduced among them for *Foreign Manners* and *Fafhions* ; becaufe they were well aware, that by this Means an *Effential Change*

a Foreign Mode. For, be assured, if any Foreigner ever acquired Wealth at Sparta by teaching or instructing their Youth, much more so should I: since they take great Pleasure in hearing my Dissertations, and give me high Encouragements: but in the Affair of Education, the Law, as I said, does not permit them the Benefit of My Instructions.

SOCRATES.

The Law, Hippias, do you suppose mischievous to the Publick, or beneficial?

HIPPIAS.

'Tis instituted, I presume, for the Benefit of the Publick: but sometimes, where the Frame of the Law is bad, it proves a Public Mischief.

SOCRATES.

Well; but do not Legislators always frame the Law with a View of procuring for the Publick the greatest Good? and because without Law 'twere impossible to live in a State of Order and good Government.

HIPPIAS.

Without Doubt, they do.

SOCRATES.

When Those therefore, who undertake the making Laws, fail of procuring Good, they have missed their End, and
erred

in their *Constitution* would gradually follow and take place. This Jealousy of theirs they carried to such a Height, that they suffered no Foreigner, or Person of Foreign Education, to take up his constant Residence in *Sparta*; nor any of their own People to reside for any considerable Length of Time in Foreign Countrys.

erred from good Government and Law. Or How say you otherwise ?

HIPPIAS.

Accurately speaking, Socrates, I must own the Thing is so : but Men are not used to affix such a Meaning to the Word, Law.

SOCRATES.

Do you speak of Men who know what Law means, or of Men who want that Knowledge ?

HIPPIAS.

I speak of the Bulk of Mankind, the Multitude.

SOCRATES.

Are These such as know the Truth of Things, this Multitude ?

HIPPIAS.

Certainly, not.

SOCRATES.

But Those who have that Knowledge, the Wise, hold That, which is more Beneficial, to be in Reality, and according to the Truth of Things, more a Law to all Men, than what is less Beneficial. Do not You agree with them in this ?

HIPPIAS.

I agree, that in Reality so it is.

SOCRATES.

Is not the Nature and the Condition of every Thing such, as Those hold it to be, who are really Knowing in the Thing ?

HIPPIAS.

HIPPIAS.

Undoubtedly.

SOCRATES.

Now to the Spartans, you say, an Education under You a Foreigner, and after a Foreign Manner, would be more beneficial, than to be educated after the Manner of their own Country.

HIPPIAS.

And I say what is True.

SOCRATES.

And That, which is more beneficial, is more a Law. This you say likewise, Hippias.

HIPPIAS.

I have admitted it so to be.

SOCRATES.

According therefore to Your Account, to have the Sons of the Spartans educated under Hippias, is more agreeable to Law ; and their Education under their Fathers is more repugnant to Law ; supposing that from You they would receive Advantages really greater.

HIPPIAS.

And so indeed would they, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Now from hence it follows, that the Spartans violate the Law, in not making You Presents of Money, and committing their Sons to Your Care.

HIPPIAS.

HIPPIAS.

Be it so : For you seem to argue thus in My Favour ; and it is not My Business to controvert your Argument.

SOCRATES.

Violaters of the Law then, my Friend, we find these Spartans, and That in the most important Article too ; These, who are thought to be the greatest Observers of it. — But in the Name of the Gods, Hippias, of what Kind are those Dissertations, for which they give you those high Encomiums ? and upon what Topicks do they take that great Pleasure in hearing you harangue ? No Doubt, they must be the same, in which You have so much excellent Knowledge ; those, which relate to the Stars and the Phænomena of the Sky.

HIPPIAS.

²⁷ They by no Means endure to hear a Word upon These Subjects.

SOCRATES.

²⁷ The Polity of the *Spartans* was contrived with a View of making them a *military* People. For this Reason, the mechanical and necessary Arts were left to Servants and Slaves ; and Such Part only of the Liberal Kind was admitted amongst them, as contributed to Military Skill, or fitted them for the Toils and the Stratagems of War. But Philosophy and the Sciences are said to have been wholly excluded. Many Passages from the Ancients in Proof of this are collected by the Annotators on *Ælian*. Var. Hist. L. 12. C. 50. and by *Nic. Craig*, in his Treatise before-cited, L. 3. Perhaps, however, it was only so in Appearance : It may be worth while to examine and consider well what *Plato* says on this Subject in his *Protagoras*, pag. 342.

SOCRATES.

But they take Pleasure in hearing a Lecture upon the Subject of Geometry.

HIPPIAS.

Not at all : for Many of the Spartans know not even the Common Rules of Arithmetick ; nay, scarcely, I may say, how to reckon.

SOCRATES.

They are far from enduring then to hear you discourse on the Nature of ²³ Numbers and Accounts.

HIPPIAS.

²³ The *Mathematical Sciences* are here enumerated, not as they stand ranked in their *natural* Order, beginning with the most simple and fundamental ; but in an Order *inverted*, beginning with the highest or first in Dignity, to which the Others serve as Steps. This is done with great Propriety. For 'tis agreeable to the usual Politeness and Address of *Socrates*, to presume at first that the Dissertations of *Hippias* were of the *nobler* and more learned Kind ; and then, finding it otherwise, to descend gradually to the Mention of those Mathematical Subjects which were the *meanest*. The Science indeed of *Musick*, in the Order of Things, as well as in that of Teaching, comes *after* the Science of *Arithmetick*, according to the *Platonic* Doctrine : yet perhaps it is placed the *last*, as if *lowest* in Dignity, because, the Subject of it being *Sound*, a Thing *sensible, external* and *passing*, it is farther removed from the *Science of Mind* than pure *Arithmetick*, the Subject of which is abstract *Number*, a Thing *Mental* and *eternal*. It is also true, that the *Heavenly Bodies*, the Subjects of *Astronomy*, are not *Mental*, nor in a *proper* Sense *eternal* : yet, because they are the *Great* and *most comprehensive Parts* of *Nature*, the *Primary Division* of the *Universe*, obvious to Sight ; and also because they are *permanent* and *undecaying*, giving us an *Image* of *Eternity* ; therefore the Science, conversant about These, is by the *Platonists* held the *noblest* of those called *Mathematical*.

HIPPIAS.

Very far from That, by Jupiter.

SOCRATES.

The Subjects, then, I warrant you, are Those, upon which You are able to dissent, divide and distinguish, with the greatest Accuracy of all Men; ²⁹ concerning the Power of Letters and Syllables, of Harmonys and Rythms.

HIPPIAS.

What Harmonys, or what Letters, my Good Man, do They concern themselves about?

SOCRATES.

Well; what Are the Subjects then, upon which they attend to you with so much Pleasure to Themselves, and so much Commendation of You? Tell me your Self, since I cannot find it out.

HIPPIAS.

²⁹ The *Spartans* were not more remarkable for a *Contempt* of Grammar and Mathematicks, than was *Hippias* for his *Skill* in those Sciences; as appears from the shorter Dialogue called by His Name. This Part of the Introduction, the third and last, receives much Grace from both these Circumstances. For the Mention of the Sciences here in this Manner, with a Mixture of *Compliment* and *Humour*, seems to arise naturally from the Character of the *Person* with whom *Socrates* is conversing, and from that of the *People* who are the present Subject of this Part of their Conversation. *Plato* uses such exquisite Art in the Oeconomy of his Dialogues, that whatever is brought upon the Carpet appears to fall in naturally: at the same time that all the Circumstances of it harmonise together; and every Particular contributes to carry on his Designs, either the principal or subordinate; being indeed purposely introduced for the Sake of These.

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HIPPIAS.

Concerning the Genealogys, O Socrates, of the Heroes and of Men ; concerning the Migration of Tribes, and settling of Colonys ; the Antiquity and first Foundation of Citys ; in a Word, concerning every thing in Ancient Story, they hearken to me with the utmost Pleasure. So that I have been obliged to study those Things my Self for Their Sakes, and to perfect my self in all that Sort of Knowledge.

SOCRATES.

By Jove, Hippias, it was fortunate for You, that the Spartans take no Pleasure in hearing a Man reckon up Our Archons from ³⁰ the Time of Solon. For if they did, the perfecting your self in such a Catalogue would put you to no little Trouble.

HIPPIAS.

Why so, Socrates ? Upon hearing Fifty Names repeated only Once, I will undertake to remember them.

SOCRATES.

³⁰ This was the *Æra* of the *Athenian Greatness*. For the Lenity of *Solon's* Laws, the Limitation which they gave to the formidable Power of a perpetual Senate, and the Popular Liberty which they established, produced in the People such a Spirit ; the Consequence always of Lenity in the Government, Legal Liberty, and a Share of Power ; that *Athens* soon grew able to rival *Sparta*, and to be her Competitor for the chief Sway and Leading in the General Affairs of *Greece*. *Plato* here therefore intends a fine *Compliment* to his *Country*. That he could have no contrary View is evident ; because the *Archons*, or Chief Magistrates of *Athens*, had been elected annually, Nine in Number, 80 Years before the Archonship of *Solon*, when his Laws were instituted. *Plato* would not have bounded his List of *Archons* with the Time of *Solon*, had his Intention been to *satyrize* the *Athenian Constitution* ; as it may seem to Some, who imagine him in all things to be in Jest, and always Satyrical.

SOCRATES.

It is true ; ³¹ but I did not consider that you had an excellent Memory. So, now I conceive the Reason, why in all Probability the Spartans are delighted with you : 'tis because you know such a Multitude of Things ; and are of the same Use to Them, that Old Women are to Children, to entertain them with the Recital of pretty Fables, and Old Storys.

HIPPIAS.

And by Jove, Socrates, upon a Manly Subject too, that of Beauty in Manners. For discoursing there lately of a compleat Rule of Manners becoming a Young Man, I gained much Applause. And I take this Opportunity, to inform you,

F 2

that

³¹ There is a Passage in the *Io*, p. 56. of our Translation, which may serve to shew us the secret Meaning of This. *Socrates* there, with an Ironical Ambiguity, says to *Io*, “ *It ill becomes a Man, who is a Rhapsodist, to be forgetful.*” The obvious Import of which Words is only this, that *'tis necessary for a Rhapsodist to remember a great Number of Verses* : but, in their latent Sense, they allude to the common Proverb, that *Liars ought to have good Memorys* : a Proverb, which the *Romans* probably borrowed from the *Greeks* ; as it is certain that We *English* derived it from the former. See *Erasm. Adag. Chil.* 2. Cent. 3. N. 74. The same Allusion seems to be here couched under an Acknowledgement of *Io's* uncommon Degree of Memory, carrying with it this concealed Meaning—*I had forgot that you were a great Liar*, and therefore a proper Person to relate Falshoods for Truth. This Interpretation is confirmed by the strong Hint given immediately after, that those ancient Traditionary Storys current amongst the *Greeks*, on which their Religion was founded, were false and meerly fabulous. But the double Meaning is more obscure in this Place than in the other, for the Reason given in the *Argument* to this Dialogue, p. 10.

that I have a Dissertation upon this Subject, extremely beautiful, finely framed in every respect, but particularly admirable for the ³² Choice of Words. The Occasion, or Way of introducing my Discourse, is This: After the Taking of Troy, Neoptolemus is supposed to ask Advice of Nestor, and to inquire of him, what Course of Life a Young Man ought to follow, in order to acquire Renown and Glory. Upon this, Nestor speaks, and lays down a great many excellent Precepts concerning the Beauty of Manners and a well-regulated Life. ³³ This Dissertation I exhibited at Sparta; and three Days hence am to exhibit the Same here at Athens, in the School of Phidostatus, together with several other Pieces of mine, worth the Hearing. I do it at the Request of Eudicus, the Son of Apemantus. You will not fail, I hope,

³² The Sophists were remarkably curious upon this Head. The Words, which they affected to use, were the smooth, the soft, and the delicate; the pompous, and the highly-compound; the splendid, the florid, the figurative and poetical; the quaint, and the uncommon; the antique, and obsolete; with many new ones of their own Invention; all in short, which any way served to please the Sense, or amuse the Fancy, without informing the Understanding. Instances of all which are recorded in the Ancient Criticks, and may be seen collected, many of them, by *Cresollus* in *Theat. Rhet.* L. 3. C. 23. As to the Diction of *Hippias* in particular, it is represented by *Maximus Tyrius*, C. 23. to have been empty and unmeaning, and his Eloquence void of Solidity.

³³ This boasted Dissertation of *Hippias* was intitled *Τρωικός*: as we learn from *Philostratus*, in whose Time it appears to have been extant. The Plan of Manners, which it laid down, if we may conjecture from the Title, was taken from the Characters of the Heroes in *Homer's Iliad*, chiefly from that of *Achilles*, *Hippias's* Favourite. See the shorter Dialogue, called by His Name.

hope, being present at it your Self, and bringing Others with you to be of the Audience, Such as are capable Judges of Performances of this Kind.

SOCRATES.

We shall do so, Hippias ; if so it please God. But at present answer me a short Question relating to your Dissertation. For you have happily reminded me. You must know, my Friend, that a ³⁴ certain Person puzzled me lately, in a Conversation we had together ; after I had been inveighing against some Things for their Baseness and Deformity, and praising some other Things for their Excellence and Beauty ; by attacking me with These Questions, in a very insolent Manner.—“ Whence came You, Socrates, said he, to “ know what Things are beautiful, and what are otherwise ? “ ³⁵ For can you tell me now, What the Beautifull is ? ”—I, thro

³⁴ This certain Person was no other, than that *Divine Principle within the Mind*, by Us commonly called *Conscience* ; never failing either to blame or commend a Man, who inwardly attends to it, after any thing said or done by Himself. It is very probable, that *Lord Shaftsbury* had from hence the first Hint of that Practice, so much recommended by him in his Treatise entitled *Soliloquy*, that of *dividing our selves into Two Persons, taking our selves to Task, and questioning our selves*. For, tho many Ancient Writings, particularly the *Dissertations* of *Epiſtetus* by *Arrian*, abound with Examples of some such Kind of Exercise ; yet This Instance of *Self-Examination*, given us here by *Plato*, is most of all exactly and literally the Same with That described by his Noble modern Disciple. See *Characterist.* vol. 1. p. 168, 169, 195.

³⁵ *Plato* has finely contrived to introduce immediately his Inquiry concerning the *Sovereign Beauty*, by the Mention of this Dissertation concerning

thro the Meanness of my Knowlege found my self at a Loss, and had nothing to answer him with any Propriety. So, quitting his Company, I grew angry with my self, reproached my self, and threatened, that, as soon as ever I could meet with Any of You Wise Men, I would hear what he had to say upon the Subject, and learn, and study it thoroughly; and That done, would return to my Questioner, and battle the Point with him over again. Now therefore, as I said, you are come happily for Me. Give me ample Information then accordingly, concerning the Nature of the Beautifull itself: and endeavour to be as accurate as possible in your Answers to what I shall ask you: that I may not be confuted a second time, and deservedly again laught at. For You understand the Question, no Doubt, perfectly well. To You such a Piece of Knowlege can be but a little one, amongst the Multitude of those, which You are Master of.

HIPPIAS.

Little enough, by Jove, Socrates; and scarcely of any Value at all.

SOCRATES.

The more easily then shall I learn it; and not be confuted or puzzled any more upon that Point by Any Man.

HIPPIAS.

concerning the *Beauty of Manners*; on purpose to have an Opportunity of inculcating This Lesson — that without such a Previous Inquiry 'tis impossible to know, What Manners are Beautiful—for he taught, that the *Science of Morals* depended on the *Prime Science*, that of *Mind*. See the latter Part of that admirable Speech, spoken by *Socrates*, in the *Symposium*.

HIPPAS.

Not by Any Man. For otherwise would My Skill be mean, and nothing beyond Vulgar Attainment.

SOCRATES.

'Twill be a brave Thing, by Juno, Hippias, to get the Better of the Man, as You promise me we shall. But shall I be any Obstacle to the Victory, if I imitate His Manner, and, after you have answered some Question of mine, make Objections to your Answer; for the Sake only of more thorough Information from You: for ³⁶ I have a tolerable Share of Experience in the Practice of making Objections. If it be no Difference therefore to You, I should be glad to have the Part of an Objector allowed me, in order to be made a better Master of the Subject.

HIPPAS.

Take the Part of an Objector then: for, as I said just now, 'tis no very knotty Point, that which You inquire about. I could teach you to answer Questions much more difficult

³⁶ The Meaning is, that he was accustomed to the Practice of *reasoning with Himself*, taking *Exceptions* to the Account of Things given by *Fancy* or *Opinion*, and *disputing* all the plausible *Appearances* of the One, and positive *Affertions* of the Other. *Plato* by this Passage prepares us for that Part of the Dialogue, upon which we are just entering: where *Socrates* argues in the Person of his ΔΑΙΜΩΝ, the *Restraining* and *Controuling* Power within him; and *Hippias* speaks the Part of *Fancy*: in the Person of whom this Sophist commends, as supremely Beautiful and Amiable, such Things as *Fancy* is used to paint in those Colours; and exhibits them in the same Order, in which they usually recommend themselves to the Mind.

difficult than this, in such a Manner, that None should ever be able to refute you.

SOCRATES.

O Rare! what Good News you tell me! But come, since You bid me your Self, I will put my self in the Place of my Antagonist, try to be what He is, to the best of my Power, and in His Person begin to question you. Now if He were of the Audience, when you exhibited that Dissertation, which you talk of, concerning the Beauty of Manners, after he had heard it through, and You had done speaking, This Point rather than any other would be uppermost in his Mind to question you upon, This relating to the Beautifull : for he has a certain Habit of so doing : and thus would he introduce it. — “ Elean Stranger ! I would ask you, whether it is not by having Honesty, that Honest Men are Honest ? ”—Answer now, Hippias, as if He proposed the Question.

HIPPIAS.

I shall answer—It is by their having Honesty.

SOCRATES.

Is not This some certain Thing then, this Honesty ?

HIPPIAS.

Clearly so.

SOCRATES.

And is it not likewise by their having Wisdom, that Wise Men are Wise ? and by having Good in them, that all Good Things are Good ?

HIPPIAS.

HIPPIAS.

Without Dispute.

SOCRATES.

And are not These some certain ³⁷ real Things? for they are not surely Non-Entitys, by whose intimate Prefence with other Things those Things are what they are.

HIPPIAS.

Undoubtedly, real Things.

SOCRATES.

I ask you then, whether all Things, which are Beautiful, are not in like manner Beautiful by their having Beauty?

HIPPIAS.

They are, by their having Beauty.

SOCRATES.

Some certain real Thing, this Beauty.

HIPPIAS.

A real Thing. But what is to come of all this?

SOCRATES.

Tell me now, Friend Stranger, will he say, What this Thing is, this Beauty, or the Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

Does not the Proposer of this Question desire to have it told him, What is Beautiful?

SOCRATES.

³⁷ This is levelled against Those, who maintained, that *Mind* and the *Objects of Mind* have no *Real Being*; attributing Reality to Nothing but That, which they are able ἀρρίξαι τὰν χειρῶν λαβεῖσθαι, says *Plato*, (*Theætet.* p. 155.) to take fast Hold of with their Hands; or, at least, which is the Object of one or other of their Senses.

SOCRATES.

I think not, Hippias: but to have it told him, What the Beautifull is.

HIPPIAS.

How does This differ from That?

SOCRATES.

Do you think there is no Difference between them?

HIPPIAS.

There is not Any.

SOCRATES.

You certainly know better. ³⁸ Observe, my good Friend, what the Question is. For he asks you, not what is Beautiful, but what is The Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

I apprehend you, honest Friend. And to That Question, What is The Beautifull, I shall give an Answer, such a one as never can be confuted. For be assured, Socrates, if the Truth must be told, a Beautiful Maiden is the Thing Beautiful.

SOCRATES.

An excellent Answer, ³⁹ by the Dog, Hippias; and such
a

³⁸ The *Greek*, as it is printed, is ἴμῳς—ἄθρει. But the Sense, as we apprehend, not admitting an *Adversative Adverb*, the true Reading probably is ὁμῶς or ὁμῶ—ἄθρει, that is, *Look close*, or *near*: for the *Attic Writers* used the Word ὁμῶ to signify the same with ἐγγύς. See *Harporat.* p. 130, 131. Ed. Gronov.

³⁹ *Plato* has in his Dialogues drawn the Picture of his Hero with an Exactness so minute, that he seems not to have omitted the least Peculiarity

a one, as cannot fail of being applauded. Shall I then, in answering thus, have answered the Question asked me? and that so well, as not to be refuted?

H I P P I A S.

How should you be refuted, Socrates, in avowing That, which is the Opinion of all the World; and the Truth of which All who hear you will attest?

S O C R A T E S.

Be it so then, by all Means. But now, Hippias, let me alone to resume the Question, with Your Answer to it, by my Self. The Man will interrogate me after this Manner.

G 2

—An-

liarity in the ordinary Conversation of that Great Man. Of this we have here an Instance very remarkable. *Socrates*, it seems, in common Discourse used frequently to swear by Brute Animals. The different Reasons which have been assigned for his so doing, and the various Censures passed on him, may be seen collected by *Menage* in Not. ad *Laert.* p. 92, 93. *M. Massieu* in the first Tome of *Les Mem. de l'Acad. des Inscrip. & Belles Lett.* p. 205. and by *M. du Soul* in Not. ad *Lucian.* vol. 1. p. 556. Ed. *Hemsterbus.* Thus much is evident, that the *Cretans* had a Law or Custom, introduced amongst them by *Rhadamanthus*, to use that very Kind of Oaths; on purpose to avoid naming, on every trivial Occasion, the Gods in whom they believed. See the Authors cited by *Olearius* in Not. ad *Philostat.* p. 257. n. 22. That the great *Athenian Philosopher* followed in This the Example of the old *Cretan Judge* and Law-giver, is the Opinion of *Porphyry*, in L. 3. *de Abstin.* §. 16. and indeed is in the highest Degree probable; because we find *Socrates* swearing by the very same Species of Animals, adjured commonly by the *Cretans*. The Dog is named the most frequently in the Oaths of Both; probably because Domestic, and the most frequently in Sight when they were talking. See the *Scholiast* on *Aristoph.* Av. §. 521. and *Suidas* in voce **Παδαμάνθους ὄρκος.*

— Answer me, Socrates, and tell me, ⁴⁰ if there be any such Thing as the Beautifull itself, ⁴¹ to whose Presence is owing the Beauty of all those Things, which you call Beautiful. Then shall I answer him thus; — ⁴² A beautiful
Maiden

⁴⁰ The *Greek* is, εἴ τι ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν. Among the *Attic* Writers εἴ has often the Force of an *Adverb* of *Interrogation*, signifying “whether;” like the *English* Particle “if.” This is one of the many Idioms of our Language, corresponding with those of the ancient *Attic Greek*. But this Idiom seems not to have been well known, or at least not here observed, by any of the Translators: for they all interpret this Part of the Sentence in a *Conditional* Sense, making εἴ a *Conditional Conjunction*. Nor does it indeed appear to have been better known to those old Transcribers of the Original, from whose Copys are printed the Editions we have of *Plato*. For their Ignorance in this Point seems to have occasioned those Corruptions of the Text, taken Notice of in the two following Notes.

⁴¹ The whole Sentence in the present Editions stands thus: Ἰθί μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίναι· ταῦτα πάντα ἃ φῆς καλὰ εἶναι, εἴ τι ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ταῦτ’ ἂν εἴη καλὰ; In the latter Part of this Sentence there is undoubtedly an *Omission*; which we ought to supply thus; Δι’ ὅ τ’ αὐτ’ ἂν εἴη καλὰ, as we read in the Sentence following, where *Socrates* repeats the Terms of the Question: or rather, Ω κ. τ. λ. the Dative Case having been used by *Socrates* just before, when he stated the Question first.

⁴² The *Greek* is printed thus: Ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ ἐρῶ, ὅτι εἰ παρθένος καλὴ, καλὸν ἐστὶ δι’ ὃ τ’ αὐτ’ ἂν εἴη καλὰ. But the Sense evidently requires us to expunge the Word εἰ before παρθένος, and to read, — ὅτι παρθένος καλὴ καλὸν ἐστὶ, κ. τ. λ. The Author of this Interpolation, no doubt, intended to make this Sentence answer to the former; and thus completed the Series of Blunders, which arose gradually from that Ignorance of the *Attic Idiom*, used in the former Sentence, of which we accused the Transcribers in Note 40. This last Blunder has been the Source of another, a most ridiculous one, made by *Augustinus Niphus*, in a *Latin*
Treatise

Maiden is That Beautifull, to whose Prefence those other Things owe their Beauty.

HIPPIAS.

⁴³ Well; and do You imagine, after This that he will ever think of refuting you? or attempt to prove Your An-

swer

Treatise *de Pulchro*. His Intention, in the former Part of that Work, is to illustrate the *Greater Hippias* of *Plato*. In Pursuance of which he thinks it incumbent on him, in the first place, to prove the Excellence of *some Particular* Beauty; such as may best shew, we presume he means, the Perfection of the Ideal Pattern. For this Purpose, he politely and gallantly urges the following Argument, manifestly borrowed from the Error complained of in this Note: "If the *Princess Joan of Arragon* be beautiful without a Fault, then there must be Something absolutely beautiful *in the Nature of Things*: But None can deny the faultless Beauty of the *Princess Joan*: Therefore, &c." And in Proof of his last Position, he gives us a long Detail of the Charms of that Princess; such as, besides the Beautys of her Mind and Sweetness of her Manners, her Golden Locks, Blue Eyes, Dimpled Chin, &c. &c. &c. from Head to Foot.

⁴³ *Hippias* was intirely a Stranger to the Theory of Mind, and had never thought or heard of any *Universal Principle* in Nature; consequently, had no Conception of any other Beauty, than what was external, and existed in *Things Particular*. Not only therefore did he mistake the Question proposed by *Socrates*; but every Explication, given of it afterwards, he adapted to those Notions, with which his Mind was prepossessed. Thus, the Character of the Beautifull, which *Socrates* here describes, in order to shew *Hippias* the Absurdity of his First Definition, serves, we find, but to confirm him in his Errors. It is clear therefore, that he understood this Description in the Sense of Lovers. For tho'tis possible he never might have felt the sweet Enthusiasm of Love, he had been a great Dabbler, we know, in Poetry; (See *Plato's Lesser Hippias*;) and Poets in all Ages have agreed in representing all the natural Sentiments of Lovers almost in the same Manner. The Sentiment,
which

swer concerning the Thing Beautiful not a just Answer? or if he should attempt it, that he would not be ridiculous?

SOCRATES.

That he will attempt it, Friend, I am well assured: but whether in so doing he will be ridiculous, will appear in the Attempt itself. However, I'll tell you, what He will say.

HIPPIAS.

Tell me then.

SOCRATES.

How pleasant you are, Socrates! he will say. Is not a beautiful Mare then a Thing Beautiful? commended as such even by the ⁴⁴ Divine Oracle. What shall we answer, Hippias?

which *Hippias* had in his Mind, is, with the greatest Propriety of the Place and of the Objects, thus expressed by *Virgil*,

Phyllidis adventu nostræ nemus omne virebit.

Ecl. 7. v. 59.

*At Phyllis' dear Approach, through all the Grove
Each Tree shall deck him in his gayest Green.*

⁴⁴ The Oracle, here meant, is recorded at large by *Jo. Tzetzes*, Chil. 9. cap. 291. of which only the following Verse relates to the present Subject.

Ἰπποὶ Θρηϊκίαι, Λακεδαιμόνιαι τε γυναῖκες.

*The Dames of Sparta, and the Mares of Thrace
Excell amongst the Females of their Kind.*

Out

pias? Shall we not acknowlege, that a Mare is beautiful likewise? meaning a Beautiful Mare. For indeed how should we dare deny, that a Beautiful Thing is beautiful?

H I P P I A S.

True, Socrates. And, no Doubt, the God rightly gave that Commendation: for with ⁴⁵ Us too there are Mares exceedingly beautiful.

S O C R A T E S.

Out of this the *Grecians*, with a little Alteration made a *Proverb*, current amongst them,

"Ἴππον Θεσσαλικὴν, Λακεδαιμονίην τε γυναῖκα.

A Spartan Dame, and a Thessalian Mare.

See *Barthius* on *Claudian*. de 4^{to} Conf. Hon. ad v. 543. pag. 697.

Hence it arose in Time, that the Words of the Oracle itself suffered a Change; and instead of *Θρηίκαι* was substituted *Θεσσαλικαί*: with which Alteration we find the Oracle cited again by the same *Tzetzes*, Chil. 10. C. 330. That the former Word is the true Reading, and the latter a Corruption, rather than the Reverse of this, is probable from the Authority of a Writer, the most ancient of those who cite this Oracle, *Eusebius*, in *Præp. Ev.* L. 5. C. 27. pag. 132. Ed. R. Steph.

⁴⁵ We learn from *Plutarch*, vol. 2. p. 303. that the People of *Elis* carried their Mares into other Countrys, to be covered. 'Tis probable therefore, that they encouraged only the *Female* Breed of that Animal at Home: especially if it be true what *Pliny* and *Servius* write, that Mares are better for a long Race. See the Annotators on *Virgil*, *Georg.* 1. v. 59. The *Elcans* were undoubtedly thus curious about the Breed, on account of the *Chariot-Races* in the Olympic Games; which were celebrated in Their Country, and from which they derived the Advantage of being suffered to enjoy a constant Peace, with Liberty and Honour,

Et

SOCRATES.

Very well now, will He say : but what, is not a beautiful Lyre too a Thing Beautiful ? Shall we allow it, Hippias ?

HIPPIAS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

After This he will say, (for with tolerable Certainty I can guess he will, from my Knowledge of his Character ;) But what think you of a beautiful ⁴⁶ Sloop-Pan, you Simpleton You ? is not That a Thing Beautiful then ?

HIPPIAS.

Et quas Elis opes ante pararat equis.

Propert. L. I. El. 8. v. 36.

*And by her Mares, so fleet in Race to run,
The Wealth which Elis anciently had won.*

⁴⁶ A negligent Reader will be apt to suppose, that the latter Three of these four Instances of Beauty existing in Particulars, the *Maiden*, the *Mare*, the *Lyre*, and the *Sloop-Dish*, are presented to us by *Plato*, just as Chance offered them to his own Mind. But *Plato* is not so negligent a Writer. A Reader who is attentive, tho not conversant in the Depth of these Divine Writings, may observe a Gradation of Excellence in these Four Forms : the First, *intelligent* and *rational* ; the Second, indued with *Sense*, and an *inward Principle* of *Life* and *Motion* ; the Third, capable of producing *Harmony*, exciting the *Affections*, and influencing the *Mind* ; the Last, capable only of *simple Sound*, and ministering only to Uses of the *Body*. But This is far from being the Whole of what is here intended. For *Plato* has, in all he writes, a Meaning much more deep and important. The Affair in Agitation is no less, than the putting us upon Inquiry, and the giving us some Insight, into the *Sovereign Beauty*, with the *several Kinds subordinate*.

Now

HIPPIAS.

Who is this Man, Socrates? I warrant, some unmannerly and ill-bred Fellow, to dare mention Things so mean and contemptible, upon a Subject so noble and so respectable.

SOCRATES.

Now the Human Form, when excellent in the Kind, being by Nature the most pleasing to Man, of all Forms external, is naturally pitched upon by *Hippias*, (who had no Notion of Universal Beauty, nor indeed of any other than Corporeal,) for the *perfect Pattern* or *just Standard* of all Beauty: in which Sense he at first understood the Question. From hence *Socrates* takes Occasion to suggest, what the *Cause* is of this pre-eminent Beauty of the Human Form: and to insinuate, that a *Fine Woman*, considered in any other View than as partaking of *Reason* and *Understanding*, is nothing superior to an Irrational Animal, such a one as is *beautiful*, with Affections *mild* and *generous*: that if, in the Consideration of Beauty, not only *Reason*, but all *inward Principle* of *Harmony* and *Spring* of *Action*, is left out of the Question, let the *Body* be ever so finely framed, or ever so delicate in its Composition, 'tis an *Instrument* fitted indeed to give *Sounds* which can *strike* the *Soul* or *entertain* the *Mind*, but is nothing more; it is like the *Lyre* without the *Musician*: that, if even this Reference to *Soul* and *Mind* be supposed wanting, if there be no Fineness of the *Organs* administering to *Sense* and *Reason*, and the Beauty lye but *Skin-deep*, or at most presenting an Idea of *sound Flesh* and *healthy Blood*, 'tis, in the natural Order of Things, but equal to a *beautiful Soup-Dish*, filled with *good Meat* and *well made Soup*.—This Interpretation, we presume, will be admitted without Difficulty by those who are versed in the Writings of the *Ancient Philosophers*. Nothing is more common with Them, than to compare Man not governed by Reason, in his *Concupiscible* Affections, to Cattle, τοῖς βοσκήμασι, and in his *Irascible*, to Wild Beasts, τοῖς θηρίοις. The Metaphor of the *Lyre* is used exactly in the same Sense, as it is here, by *Plato* in his *Phædo*, p. 85, 86. and frequently by the *Platonists* in Imitation of their Master. See in particular *Porphyry*, Ἀπομ. §. 19. Me-

H

taphors

SOCRATES.

Such is the Man, Hippias ; not nice and delicate ; but a mean shabby Fellow, without Consideration or Regard for Aught except This, in every Inquiry,—What is True.—The Man, however, must have an Answer : and in order to it, I thus premise — If the Pan be made by a Good Workman, smooth, and round, and well-baked ; like some of our handsome Soop-Pans with two Handles, those which hold six ⁴⁷ Coas, exceedingly beautiful in truth ; if he mean such a Pan as These are, the Pan must be confessed Beautiful. For how indeed could we deny That to be beautiful, which has real Beauty ?

HIPPIAS.

By no Means, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Is not a beautiful Soop-Pan then, he will say, a Thing Beautiful ? Answer.

HIPPIAS.

taphors of near Affinity with that of the *Pan*, *χύτρα*, to illustrate the same Thing which is here meant by it, are often used by the *Stoicks* and Those who borrowed from Them ; such as *ἄσκος*, *ἄγλειον*, *θύλακος*, *ξέστης* by way of Diminutive, &c. The very same Word, *χύτρα*, in *Epicet. Ench.* C. 3. Edit. *Upton*. (but in the common Editions, Cap. 8.) has probably a Reference to the same Metaphorical Meaning. This will make a great Propriety in the Application of the Verb *εἰργεῖν* there to *χύτρα*, which, otherwise, justly seems strange to the late judicious Editor of that Book, *Dr. Simpson*. That whole Chapter receives, we think, an additional Beauty from being seen in such a Light.

⁴⁷ According to the accurate *Dr. Arbuthnot's* Computation, the *Attic* *χῆς* or *χά* was a Measure containing three Quarts. So that the fine *Tourenes*, here mentioned, held $4\frac{1}{2}$ Gallons.

HIPPIAS.

Well then, Socrates ; My Opinion of the Case is this : Even this Vessel, if well and handsomely made, is a beautiful Thing likewise. But Nothing of this Kind deserves to be mentioned as Beautiful, when we are speaking of a Mare, and a Maiden, or any other Thing thus admirable for its Beauty.

SOCRATES.

So ; now I apprehend you, Hippias ; when the Man asks such a Question as that, we are thus, it seems, to answer him :—Honest Man ! Are you ignorant how it was said well by Heraclitus, “ that the most beautiful Ape, in Comparison with the ⁴³ Human Kind, is a Creature far from beautiful ? ” Just so, the most beautiful Soop-Pan is a Thing far from beautiful in Comparison with the Maiden-Kind ; as it is said by Hippias the Wise.—Is it not thus, Hippias, that we must answer ?

H 2

HIPPIAS.

⁴⁸ In the *Greek* we read ἄλλω γένει. But, that we ought to read ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει, there is no Occasion, we presume, for any Arguments to prove. It will sufficiently appear from what is quoted presently after from the same *Heraclitus*. For however *dark* or *mysterious* his Writings might have been, as we are told they were, yet there is no Reason to think he wrote *absurdly*. But the Absurdity was easily committed by the *Transcribers* of *Plato* ; who probably sometimes did not well understand his Meaning, certainly were not always very attentive to it. For we learn from Those who are much conversant with *ancient Manuscripts*, that ἀνθρώπων often, and ἀνθρωπίνῳ sometimes, is written in this concise manner, ἄνῳ. And no Error is more common in the Editions of *Greek Authors*, than such as are occasioned by this very Abbreviation.

HIPPIAS.

By all Means, Socrates : your Answer is perfectly right.

SOCRATES.

Mind me now : for upon This, I am well assured, He will say to me thus ; “ But suppose, Socrates, the Maiden-
 “ Kind were to be set in Comparison with the Goddess-
 “ Kind ; would not the same Accident befall the Maidens
 “ in that Case, which happened to the Soop-Pans com-
 “ pared with Them ? Would not the fairest Maiden appear
 “ far from being beautiful ? Does not Heraclitus farther
 “ teach this very Doctrine, ⁴⁹ which You your self must needs
 “ infer

⁴⁹ The *Greek* is thus printed, ὃν σὺ ἐπάγῃ ; and by all the Translators interpreted after this manner, “ *That Heraclitus, whose Testimony you cite :*” as if the Word μάστιγα was tacitly understood after ἐπάγῃ. Whether this Interpretation be agreeable to the Words of *Plato*, or not ; we see it plainly repugnant to the Matter of Fact : for it was not *Hippias*, but *Socrates* himself, who had just before cited *Heraclitus*. Supposing, however, that the Writings of this Philosopher were cited frequently by *Hippias* ; and that possibly therefore the Meaning might be this, “ *He, whose Testimony you are used to cite ;*” yet the Alteration of the Word ὃν into “O”AN will, we presume, to every attentive and judicious Reader appear to make better Sense and Reasoning. For the Saying of *Heraclitus*, which follows, as this Philosopher *inferred* the Truth of it, by Analogy, from his Comparison between *Apes* and *Men* ; is no less a proper *Inference*, in the same Way of Reasoning, from what *Hippias* had just before admitted to be his own Meaning, and the Amount of what he had said concerning the *Soop-Pan* compared with a beautiful *Maiden*. Our learned Readers will also observe the Construction to be much easier, and more natural, when the Sentence is read thus ; Ἡ ἔ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ταυτὸν τῷτο λέγει, ὃ ἂν σὺ ἐπάγῃ.

“ infer to be true ;—that ⁵⁰ the Wifest of Men, compared
 “ with a God, will appear an Ape in Wisdom and Beauty
 “ and every other Excellence ?” —Shall we own, Hippias,
 the fairest Maiden far from beautiful in Comparison with
 a Goddess ?

HIPPIAS.

Who, Socrates, would presume to call This in question ?

SOCRATES.

No sooner then shall I have agreed with him in This,
 than He will laugh at me, and say, “ Do you remember, So-
 “ crates, what Question you was asked ?” I do, I shall tell
 him ; it was This ; “ What Kind of Thing was the Beautifull
 “ its Self ?” “ When the Question then, he will say, con-
 “ cerned the Beautifull its Self, your Answer was concern-
 “ ing That which happens to be far from beautiful, accord-
 “ ing to your own Confession, as beautiful as it is.” “ So
 “ it

⁵⁰ In this Quotation from *Heracitus* Every one will discern the Ori-
 ginal of that Thought in Mr. *Pope's Essay on Man*,

*Superior Beings, when of late they saw
 A Mortal Man unfold all Nature's Law,
 Admir'd such Wisdom in an Earthly Shape,
 And shew'd a Newton, as We shew an Ape.*

There is, however, we imagine, some Difference in the Application.
 For the Meaning of *Heracitus*, if *Plato* introduced him at all to the
main Purpose of his Dialogue, was to insinuate, that Reasonings and
 Rules meerly human, that is, such as were not true and good eternally,
 were but Apish and ridiculous Imitations of Right Reasoning and True
 Law, which are purely of Divine Original.

“ it seems,”—shall I say ? or what other Reply, my Friend, do you advise me to make him ?

HIPPIAS.

I think, for My Part, you must reply in those very Words. ⁵¹ For, when he says, that the Human Kind, compared with the Divine, is far from beautiful, without Doubt he will have the Truth on his Side.

SOCRATES.

But were I to have asked you at first This Question, will he say, “ What is beautiful, and ⁵² at the same time Far from beautiful ;” and You were to have answered me in the Manner you did ; would not you in that Case have answered rightly ? And does the Beautifull then its Self, by which every Other Thing is ornamented, and looks beautiful, whenever this Form of Beauty supervenes and invests it, imparting thus the Virtue of its Presence, does This still appear to you to be a Maiden, or a Mare, or a Lyre ?

HIPPIAS.

⁵¹ We intirely agree with Monf. *Maucroy*, in assigning the following Sentence to *Hippias* ; tho all the other Tranflations, with the printed Editions of the *Greek*, attribute it to *Socrates*. The Error seems to have arisen from want of observing, that the Particle *καὶ* in *Plato* has frequently the Force of *γὰρ* ; and that *καὶ δὲ*, tho oftner *καὶ μὲν δὲ*, answers to the *Latin* “ *enimverò*.”

⁵² This refers to that *Duplicity* of the *Human Soul*, mentioned in Note 34. The *Pythagoreans* and *Platonists*, in describing Human Nature, present us often with the View of those two different Principles in Man at the same time, the *Divine*, and the meerly *Animal* ; by inclining to one or other of which he resembles either a *Deity* or a *Brute* : ἀπρίσσις τις ὢν, says *Hierocles*, καὶ μεσότης τῶν ἔτω διεσκηότων. *Com. in A. C.* ad *ψ.* 52. See likewise *Lord Shaftsb.* vol. 1. p. 184, 195.

HIPPIAS.

Truly, Socrates, if This be the Question which he asks, it is the easiest thing imaginable to answer it; and to tell him, What that beautiful Thing is, by which other Things are ornamented; and which, by supervening and investing them, makes them look beautiful. So that He must be a very simple Fellow, and intirely a Stranger to Things elegant and fine. For if you only answer him thus, “ that “ the Beautifull, which He inquires after, is nothing else “ than Gold,” he will have no more to say, nor attempt ever to refute Such an Answer. Because None of us can be insensible, that, wherever Gold be applied or superinduced, let the Thing have looked ever so vile and fordid before, yet then it will look beautiful, when ’tis invested or ornamented with Gold.

SOCRATES.

You have no Experience of the Man, Hippias; how unyielding he is, and how hard in admitting any Assertion.

HIPPIAS.

What signifys That, Socrates? he must of Necessity admit what is rightly asserted; or, in not admitting it, expose himself to Ridicule.

SOCRATES.

And yet will He be so far from admitting this Answer, my Friend, that he will treat Me with open Derision, and say to me, “ You that are so puffed up with the Opinion of “ your own Skill and Knowlege, do you think Phidias was a

“ Bad Workman ? ” — And I believe I shall answer, that he was far from being so.

HIPPIAS.

You will answer rightly, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Rightly, without Dispute. But He, when I have agreed with him that Phidias was a good Workman, will say, “ Do you imagine then, that Phidias was ignorant of That which you call the Beautifull ? ” — “ To what Purpose do you ask This ? ” I shall say. — “ Because Minerva’s Eyes, will He reply, Phidias made not of Gold, nor yet the rest of her Face ; nor the Feet, nor the Hands neither : tho she would have looked handsomest, it seems, had she been a Golden Goddess : but he made ⁵³ These all of Ivory. ’Tis evident, that he committed this Error thro Ignorance ; not knowing, that Gold it was, which beautified all things, wherever it was applied.” — When he talks after this Manner, what Answer shall we make him, Hippias ?

HIPPIAS.

⁵³ All the other Parts, not here mentioned, were of massive Gold : as we collect from *Pliny’s Natural History*, L. 36. C. 6. compared with this Place. For the *Athenian Minerva* was always painted or carved with *Martial Habiliments*. It became a *Goddess* to have These made of *Gold*. And with equal Propriety, no Doubt, did *Phidias* make of *Ivory* the Parts supposed to be left *naked*. The *Olympian Jupiter*, and *This* admirable Statue, the Size of which far exceeded the Human, were esteemed the Capital Works of that Great Master. See *Plin. Hist. Nat.* L. 34. C. 8. The *Minerva* stood in the Παρθενών, or Temple of that Goddess, at *Athens*.

HIPPIAS.

There is no Difficulty at all in the Matter. We shall answer, “ Phidias was in the Right ; for Things made of Ivory are also, as I presume, Beautiful.”

SOCRATES.

“ What was the Reason then, will He say, why Phidias made not the Pupil of the Eyes out of Ivory, but ⁵⁴ out of Stone rather ? chusing for that Purpose such Stone, as [in Colour] most resembled Ivory. Is a beautiful Stone then a Thing beautiful too ? ” — Shall we admit it so to be, Hippias ?

HIPPIAS.

We will ; in a Place where the Stone is Becoming.

SOCRATES.

But where it is Unbecoming, shall I allow it to be Unhandsome, or not ?

HIPPIAS.

Allow it ; where the Stone becomes not the Place.

SOCRATES.

⁵⁴ This seems to have been very judicious in the Statuary. For *Stone*, not being so smooth in itself, nor capable of so high a Polish as *Ivory*, absorbs the Rays of Light more ; and consequently, we should imagine, must give the Pupils of the Eyes, amidst the Ivory round them, a Look less flat and dead, and more resembling Life. The Words in the Parenthesis we have added by way of Explanation. But the whole of this Note we submit to the Judgment of those excellent Statuaries among Us, who in After-times will be deemed to have done the Present Age so much Honour.

SOCRATES.

“ Well now ; and is it not the Same with Ivory and Gold,
 “ You Wife Man you ? ” will He say. “ Do not These,
 “ where they are Becoming, make Things appear Hand-
 “ some ; but far otherwise, where they are Unbecoming ? ”
 Shall we deny this, or acknowlege the Man to be in the
 Right ?

HIPPIAS.

We must acknowlege This, that Whatever is Becoming to
 any thing, makes it appear Handsome.

SOCRATES.

Upon this, He will say thus : “ When that fine Soop-Pan
 “ then, which we have been speaking of, is set upon the Stove,
 “ full of ⁵⁵ excellent Soop ; whether is a Golden Spoon the
 “ most becoming and proper for it, or a Sycamore Spoon ? ”

HIPPIAS.

Hercules ! What a strange Sort of Man, Socrates, is He
 whom you are talking of ! Will you not tell me, Who he is ?

SOCRATES.

⁵⁵ The fine compound Soops of the *Athenians*, to prevent spoiling
 the Contexture of Some of the Ingredients, and confounding the Order
 of Others, were, many of them, served up to Table in the very Stew-
 ing-Pans, in which they were made. See *Aristoph. Eq.* Act. 4. Sc. 1.
Athenæus, L. 9. pag. 406. and *Casaubon*. in *Athen.* pag. 693. For this
 Reason that elegant People was very curious about the Beauty of these
 Pans or Dishes. The Matter of them seems to have been a Kind of
 Porcelain, and the Form not unlike our Tourenes. If the Curiosity
 of any of our Readers should lead them to inquire into the Composition
 of these Soops, they may satisfy it in some measure by looking into *Athe-
 næus*, and *Apicius Calius*, L. 5. C. 3.

SOCRATES.

Should I tell you his Name, You would not know him.

HIPPIAS.

But I know already, that he is some ignorant silly Fellow.

SOCRATES.

He is a very troublesome Questioner indeed, Hippias. But however, what shall We answer? Which of the two Spoons shall we say is most becoming and proper for the Soup and for the Pan? Is it not clearly the ⁵⁶ Sycamore Spoon? For This gives a better Scent and Flavour to the Soup; and at the same time, my Friend, it would not break the Pan, and spill the Soup, and put out the Fire, and when the Guests were come prepared for feasting, rob

I 2

them

⁵⁶ In the *Greek* συκίνη. But that we ought to read συκαμίνη, there is great Reason to suspect. For the Wood of the Fig-Tree was found so unfit a Material in the making any domestic Utensils, &c. that the *Greeks* in common Speech metaphorically called whatever was useless, σύκινον, a Fig-Tree Thing, This or That. Upon which Account *Horace* gives that Wood the Epithet of “Inutile,” L. 1. Sat. 8. —Whereas the Wood of the Sycamore-Tree, συκάμινος, is by *Theophrastus* said to be ξύλον — πρὸς πολλὰ χρήσιμον, *Hist. Plant.* L. 4. C. 2 Not to insist on the extreme Bitterness of Fig-Tree-Wood to the Taste; and the Offensiveness of its Smoak, when burning, beyond that of any other Tree: (see *Plutarch*, vol. 2. p. 684.) Qualities, which seem to indicate the Scent and Flavour of it not to be very agreeable. The Alteration of this Word is easily accounted for. The συκάμινος, or συκόμορος, being the same with the συκῇ Αἰγύπτια, 'tis probable that the *Alexandrian Platonists*, to illustrate the Word συκαμίνη, wrote in the Margin of their Books συκίνη: which afterwards the more easily took Place of the Other, because the Fig-Tree was well known to be the most common of any Tree in *Attica*.

them of an excellent Dish. But all these Mischiefs would be done by that Golden Spoon. We must, I think therefore, answer, that the Sycamore Spoon is more becoming and proper in this Case than the Golden Spoon : unless You say otherwise.

HIPPIAS.

Well, Socrates ; more becoming and proper be it then : but, for My Part, I would not hold Discourse with a Fellow, who asked such Sort of Questions.

SOCRATES.

Right, my dear Friend. For it would not be Becoming or Proper for You, to be bespattered with such vile dirty Words, ⁵⁷ so finely dressed as you are from Top to Toe, and so illustrious for Wisdom through all Greece. But for Me—'tis Nothing to ⁵⁸ dirty my self against the Man. Give me my Lesson therefore, what I am to say ; and answer in My Name. For the Man now will say thus ; “ If the Sycamore Spoon then be more Becoming and Proper than the Golden one, must it not be Handsomer ? ”

HIPPIAS.

⁵⁷ The fine Dress, in which *Hippias* appeared at the Olympic Games, is related by *Plato* in the lesser Dialogue of His Name ; and more at large, by *Apuleius*, Florid. Lib. 2. *Ælian* also tells us, that the ordinary Attire of that Sophist, whenever he appeared abroad, was of a Scarlet Colour, such as in those Days peculiarly belonged to Persons of high Dignity, *Var. Hist.* L. 12. C. 32.

⁵⁸ Meaning, that he was accustomed to submit his Fancies and Passions to the severe Discipline and rough Treatment of his Higher Principle.

HIPPIAS.

Since the Proper and Becoming, Socrates, you have granted to be handsomer than the Improper and Unbecoming.

SOCRATES.

What, Hippias ; and shall we grant him too, that the Sycamore Spoon has more Beauty in it than the Golden Spoon ?

HIPPIAS.

Shall I tell you, Socrates, what you shall say the Beautiful is, so as to prevent him from all farther cavilling and disputing ?

SOCRATES.

By all means : but not before you tell me, whether of the two Spoons, we have been talking of, is the most Beautiful, as well as the most Proper and Becoming.

HIPPIAS.

Well then ; if it pleases You, answer him, “ It is That made of the Sycamore-Tree.”

SOCRATES.

Now say what you was just going to say. For This Answer, in which I pronounce Gold to be the Beautiful, will be refuted ; and Gold will be demonstrated, I find, not to be at all more beautiful than Sycamore Wood. But What, say you, is the Beautiful, now ?

HIPPIAS.

I will tell you. For when you ask me, “ What is the
“ Beau-

“ Beautifull,” you would have me, I perceive, give you for Answer Something which shall never, in any Place, or to any Person, appear otherwise than beautiful.

SOCRATES.

By all means, Hippias. And now you apprehend me perfectly well. ⁵⁹ But observe what I say : be assured, that if any Man shall be able to controvert our new Answer, I shall vow never more to praise any thing for its Beauty. Now in the Name of the Gods proceed, and tell it me without Delay.

HIPPIAS.

I say then, that Always, and to every Person, and in every Place, it will appear the most beautiful, lovely, and desirable Thing in the World, to be Rich, Healthy, Honoured by his Country, to arrive at a good old Age, to give his Parents an honourable Burial, and at length to have the
last

⁵⁹ In Conformity with all the Editions of the *Greek*, and the Translations of *Grynæus* and *Serranus*, we have ascribed the following Words, ending with “ *any more*,” to *Socrates* ; in a Sense agreeable to what he has before said in Page 45, and also to his concluding Speech at the End of this Dialogue.—*Ficinus* and *Bembo* in Their Translations, and *H. Stephens* in his Notes, parcel out the Sentence, and assign Those Words to *Hippias* ; putting a Sense on them, not quite so natural, as we apprehend, nor so apposite to the Purpose.—*Cornarius* indeed, followed by *Monf. Maucroy*, gives them a Sense humorous enough, and agreeable to the Character of *Hippias* ; but, in so doing is obliged to alter the Word *ἐπαινεῖν* into *ἐπαίειν*. If any Manuscript favoured this Alteration, we should be inclined to adopt it, translating the Passage thus : *HIPP. “ Hear me then ; and if any Man can object Aught against what I am going to say, I shall own that I know Nothing.”*

last Offices performed for himself honourably and magnificently by his own Issue.

SOCRATES.

O Brave ! O Rare ! how admirable, how great, and how worthy of your Self, Hippias, is the Speech, you have now spoken ! By Juno, I receive with much Pleasure that hearty Willingness of yours to give me all the Assistance in Your Power. But we reach not the Point yet. For now will the Man laugh at us more than ever, you may be assured.

HIPPIAS.

An ill-timed Laugh, Socrates. For in laughing, when he has nothing to object, he will in Reality laugh only at Himself ; and be the Ridicule of All, who happen to be present.

SOCRATES.

Perhaps so. But perhaps also, as soon as I have thus answered, I shall be in Danger, if I prophesy aright, of something besides the being laughd at.

HIPPIAS.

What besides ?

SOCRATES.

That, if he happens to have a Cane in his Hand, unless I run away and escape him, he will aim some very serious Strokes at me.

HIPPIAS.

How say you ? What, is the Man some Master of yours then ? for otherwise, would he not be punished for the Injury done you ? or is there no Justice in Your City ? but
the

the Citizens are permitted to assault and beat one another injuriously.

SOCRATES.

By no Means are they permitted to do any such Thing.

HIPPIAS.

Will he not therefore be condemned to Punishment, as having beat you injuriously ?

SOCRATES.

I should think he would not, Hippias ; not having beat me injuriously, if I had made him such an Answer ; but very deservedly, as it seems to Me.

HIPPIAS.

It seems so then to Me, Socrates ; if You are of that Opinion, your Self.

SOCRATES.

Shall I tell you, why, in my own Opinion, I should have deserved a Beating, if I had so answered ?—Will You condemn me too without trying the Cause ? or will you hear what I have to say ?

HIPPIAS.

'Twould be a hard Case indeed, Socrates, should I deny you a Hearing. But What have you to say then ?

SOCRATES.

I will tell you ; but in the same Way, as I talked with you just now, assuming his Character, whilst You personate Me. I shall do this, to avoid treating you in your own Person with such Language, as He will use in reprimanding

manding Me, with harsh and out-of-the-way Terms. For I assure you, that He will say thus : —“ Tell me, Socrates ; “ think you not, that you deserve a Beating, for having “ sung that Pompous Strain, so foreign to the Design of “ the Musick ; spoiling thus the Harmony, and wander- “ ing wide of the Point proposed to you? ” —“ How so?” I shall ask him. — “ How? he will reply : Can you not “ remember, that I asked you concerning the Beautifull it- “ self, ‘ That which makes every Thing beautiful, wherever “ it comes and imparts the Virtue of its Presence ; whe- “ ther it communicates it to Stone or Wood, to Man or “ God, to Actions and Manners, or to any Part of Science. “ Beauty itself, Man, I ask you, What it is : and I can no “ more beat it into your Head what I say, than if you “ were a Stone lying by my Side, nay a Mill-Stone too, “ without Ears or Brains.” Now, Hippias, would not You be angry with me, if I, frightened with this Reprimand, should say to him thus : — “ Why, Hippias said, this was “ the Beautifull ; and I asked him, just as You ask Me, “ what was Beautiful to all Persons, and at all Times.” — What say you? Will you not be angry, if I tell him thus?

HIPPIAS.

That which I described, Socrates, is beautiful, I am very positive, in the Eyes of All Men ⁶⁰.

SOCRATES.

⁶⁰ At the End of this Sentence, in the *Greek*, are added the Words, *καὶ δοξάζει*. These we have omitted to translate ; on a Presumption, that they were at first but a Marginal various Reading of the Words which follow,

THE GREATER

SOCRATES.

“ And always Will it be so? he will say : for the Beau-
 “ full itself must be Always beautiful.”

HIPPIAS.

To be sure.

SOCRATES.

“ And always Was it so in former Times?” he will say.

HIPPIAS.

It always Was so.

SOCRATES.

“ What ; and to ⁶¹ Achilles too, he will say, did
 “ the Elean Stranger affirm ’twas a beautiful and desirable
 “ Thing to survive his Progenitors? and that ’twas the
 “ same to his Grandfather Æacus, and the rest of Those,
 “ who

follow, καὶ ἔσται, spoken by *Socrates*. For the Difference between *Real* and *Apparent* Beauty falls not under Consideration in this Part of the Argument.

⁶¹ *Achilles* was the reputed Son of the Goddess *Thetis* ; and *Æacus*, of *Jupiter* himself. But the Supposition, that *Achilles* and *Æacus* survived their Parents, would have transformed those Deitys into meer Mortals ; and consequently would have greatly derogated from the Honour of their Issue, and have diminished that Felicity which these Heroes were thought to have attained. — But besides this, in the Case of *Achilles*, the Height of his Glory arose from his Choice of a short Life, full of generous Sentiments and heroic Actions, to be completed before the Death of his Father *Peleus*. The Intention of *Plato* in this Passage is to shew, that there is no Scheme of Happiness, meerly Human, consistent and always the Same ; but that the outward Condition of Life, desirable, varies with the various Circumstances of Persons and of Things.

“ who were the Progeny of the Gods? nay, that ’twas so
 “ even to the Gods themselves? ”

HIPP I A S.

What a Fellow is this ! ⁶² Away with him. Such Quef-
 tions as these are profane, and improper to be asked.

SOCRATES.

But is it not much more profane for any Man, when
 these Questions are asked him, to answer in the Affirmative,
 and to maintain such Propositions ?

HIPP I A S.

Perhaps it is.

SOCRATES.

“ Perhaps then You are this Man, will he say ; who
 “ affirm it to be a Thing always, and to every Person,

K 2

“ beau-

⁶² The *Greek* is, βάλλ’ ἐς μακαρίαν. Various Explications of this Proverb are given us by *Timæus* (in *Lexic. Platonic.*) *Hesychius*, *Suidas*, and Others. But to Us None of them are satisfactory. *Erasmus*, with his usual Acuteness and Sagacity, was the First, so far as We know, who discovered the most probable Origin of it : tho with his usual Socratic Modesty he only says, it seems to be so ; and after the Accounts usually given of it, offers his own, which is This : that the particular Spot of Ground, where a great Part of the *Persian* Forces perished in the Battle of *Marathon*, a deep Marsh in which they sunk and were overwhelmed, being, as he observes from *Pausanias*, called Μακαρία, the *Grecians* used this Proverbial Speech by way of Detestation, when they cursed any Man ; *Throw him into Macaria ; (the Place, where our detested Enemies lye perished.)* See *Erasm. Adag. Chil. 2. Cent. 1. N. 98.* *Schottus* gives the same Interpretation, in the very Words of *Erasmus* ; but, like many other learned Commentators, without acknowledging his Author, *Schol. in Zenobium*, p. 42.

“ beautiful and desirable, to be buried by his Descendants,
 “ and to bury his Parents. Was not Hercules One of these
 “ Every Persons? and Those whom we just now mention-
 “ ed, are not They also to be included in the Number?”

HIPPITAS.

But I did not affirm it was so to ⁶³ the Gods.

SOCRATES.

Nor to the Heroes, I presume.

HIPPITAS.

Not to Such, as were Children of the Gods.

SOCRATES.

But to Such only, as were not so.

HIPPITAS.

Right.

SOCRATES.

Amongst the Number of Heroes then, it seems, according to Your Account, to ⁶⁴ Tantalus, and Dardanus, and Zethus,

⁶³ *Hercules* was the only one of the Heroes, except *Bacchus*, who, according to the Pagan System of Theology, was advanced after his Death, on Account of his superior Virtue, to Divinity itself. To *Hippitas* therefore, *Hercules* is the strongest Instance that could be given, to prove the Impiety of what He had asserted.

⁶⁴ In the Opinion of the Vulgar, these Three were Heroes and Sons of *Jupiter*, no less than were *Æacus* and *Hercules*; tho in Point of Merit they were far inferior. For the Greatness of these *Popular Heroes*, was merely Popular and External, devoid of true Virtue. The Lives of *Dardanus* the First King of *Troy*, and of *Zethus* the Co-Founder of *Thebes*, were not illustrious for any Great and Heroic Actions; and that of *Tantalus* was stained with an unnatural and enormous Crime, the Murder

Zethus, it would have been a sad Thing, a horrible Profanation of Deity to suppose it, and a fatal Blow to their own Honour; but to Pelops, and Others born of Men like Him, it was a glorious Thing, beautiful, and desirable.

HIPPIAS.

So I think it to be.

SOCRATES.

“ You think This then to be true, the Contrary of
 “ which You maintained just now, will he say, that to sur-
 “ vive their Ancestors, and to be buried by their Descen-
 “ dants, is, in Some ⁶⁵ Cases, and to Some ⁶⁶ Persons, a
 “ dishonourable and a horrible Thing : nay more, it seems
 “ not possible that such a Thing should be, or ever become,
 “ beau-

Murder of his own Son, *Pelops*. On the Contrary, the whole Life of *Hercules* was devoted to the Service of Mankind, in the freeing them from the lawless Violence of Robbers and Oppressors, signified under the Fables of Monsters laying waste the whole Country. And as to the Other, *Æacus*, he was so famed for the Justice and Equity of his Government, that he was supposed a fit Person to be associated with *Minos* and *Rhadamanthus*, in the Tribunal of Justice, for determining the State of all Men after Death : by *Plato* in his *Apology*, or Defence of *Socrates*, he is numbered amongst the Demi-Gods ; and by the Oracle of *Apollo*, cited in *Porphyry's Life of Plotinus*, he is called the *Righteous Æacus*. In this particular Passage therefore, not only *Hippias*, but the Vulgar Religion, which confounded Good and Evil, is humorously ridiculed : and at the same time, by presenting to the Mind the Remembrance of different Heroes, Some falsely so called, and Others of the *Genuine* Kind, the Life, so highly extolled by *Hippias*, is set in Contrast with the Life truly *Heroic* and truly *Happy*.

⁶⁵ Meaning the Case of *Achilles*.

⁶⁶ That is, to the *Heroes*.

“ beautiful and desirable to ⁶⁷ All. So that This, which
 “ you now hold to be the Beautifull, happens to be in the
 “ same Case with those your former Favorites, the Maiden
 “ and the ⁶⁸ Gold; sometimes it is beautiful, and some-
 “ times otherwise: but a Circumstance still more ridicu-
 “ lous attends This; it is beautiful only to Some Persons,
 “ whilst to Others it is quite the Contrary. And not yet,
 “ will he say, not all this Day long, are you able, Socrates,
 “ to answer the Question which you were asked — What
 “ the Beautifull is.” — In Terms such as These will He
 reproach me justly, should I answer him as You directed
 me. — Much after the Manner, Hippias, which I have
 now represented to you, proceed the Conversations usually
 held between the Man and Me ⁶⁹. But now and then, as
 if

⁶⁷ That is, to the *Gods*, Immortal and Immutable. But Those, who
 are truly acquainted with *Plato*, will perceive, that his Drift, in all this
 Part of the Dialogue, is to insinuate, that Men of Heroic Souls, like
Achilles, or of Godlike Minds, like *Æacus*, or of Divine Virtue, like
Hercules, place not their Supreme Good, where *Hippias* did, in the
 Gifts of Fortune; but in that which is *Invariable* and to be found *with-*
in Themselves, That, which is the Subject of this whole Dialogue.

⁶⁸ The *Greek* here, by a most absurd Corruption of the Text, is
 printed *χύρα*, instead of *χρυσός*: a Corruption, admitted and follow-
 ed by all the Translators. One would imagine, that the *Minds* of
 them all, as well as of the Printers and old Transcribers, were wholly
 in the *Scoop-Pan*.

⁶⁹ Meaning, that his Divine Genius usually acted only a *Negative*
 Part, *opposing* and *combating* the Suggestions of his Fancy, in every
 Case where he was in Danger of being led by This into *false* Opinions,
 or *bad* Actions. (See *Plato's Theages*.) However, that some-
 times,

if in Pity to my Ignorance and Want of Learning, he proposes to me Himself some Particular Matter of Inquiry ; and asks me, whether I think Such or Such a Thing to be the Beautifull ; or whatever else be the General Subject of the Question, which He has been pleased to put to me, or upon which the Conversation happens at that time to turn.

HIPPIAS.

How mean you, Socrates ?

SOCRATES.

I will explain my Meaning to you by an Instance in the present Subject. — “ Friend Socrates, says he, let us have
 “ done with disputing in this Way : give me no more An-
 “ swers of this Sort ; for they are very filly and easily con-
 “ futed. But consider now, whether the Beautifull be
 “ Something of This Kind ; Such, as in our Dispute just
 “ now we touched upon ; when we said, that Gold, where
 “ it was proper and becoming, was beautiful ; but other-
 “ wise, where it was improper and unbecoming ; and that
 “ the Beauty of all other Things depended on the Same
 “ Principle ; that is, they were beautiful, only where they
 “ were becoming : Now this very Thing, the Proper and
 “ Becoming, essential Propriety and Decorum itself, see
 “ whether This may not happen to be the Beautifull.”

—Now,

times, tho' rarely, the same Superior inward Principle would *positively* suggest Opinions, which it was *right* to entertain ; or prompt him to Actions, in which it was *good* to be engaged.

—Now, for my Part, I am used to give my ⁷⁰ Assent, in Such Matters, to Every Thing proposed to me. For I find in my Self Nothing to object. But what think You of it? are You of Opinion, that the Becoming is the Beautiful?

HIPPIAS.

Intirely am I, Socrates, of that Opinion.

SOCRATES.

Let us consider it, however; for fear we should be guilty of some Mistake in this Point.

HIPPIAS.

I agree, we ought so to do.

SOCRATES.

Observe then. That which we call the Becoming, is it not either Something, whose Presence, wherever it comes, giveth all things a beautiful Appearance; or Something, which gives them the Reality of Beauty; or Something,
which

⁷⁰ Meaning, that his Inferior Soul was apt to catch at every Appearance of Beauty, Truth, or Good, unexamined and without Consideration, whether presented to it by the Senses or by the Mind. For *Socrates*, having made that Division of himself, mentioned in Note 34, modestly calls the Inferior Part, that which is merely Human, *Himself*; and the Other, which is Divine, sometimes by the Name of *Δαίμων*, or Middle Nature between God and Man, and sometimes with our modern Philosophic Poet — *the God within the Mind*. This will be a Key to many Passages of *Plato*, where he opposes Men to Gods. See farther concerning This, in our Notes on the Speech of *Socrates* in the *Banquet*.

which bestows ⁷¹ Both, and causes them not only to appear beautiful, but really so to be?

HIPPAS.

I think, it must be One or Other of these.

SOCRATES.

Whether of these then is the Becoming? Is it That, which only gives a beautiful Appearance? as a Man, whose Body is of a deformed Make, when he has put on Cloaths or Shoes which fit him, looks handsomer than he really is. Now if the Becoming causes every Thing to look handsomer than it really is, the Becoming must then be a Kind of Fraud or Imposition with regard to Beauty, and cannot be That which We are in Search of, Hippias. For We were inquiring what That was, by which all beautiful Things are Beautiful. ⁷² As, if we were asked what That was, by which

⁷¹ A most egregious and gross Blunder has corrupted the *Greek Text* in this Place; where we read ὁδότερα. Instead of which, we ought to read ἀμφοτέρα: as will appear clearly in the Course of the Argument. Yet, gross as the Blunder is, all the Translators have given into it.

⁷² In the *Greek* we read, ὥσπερ ὃ πάντα τὰ μεγάλα ἐς μεγάλα, τῷ ὑπερέχοντι. *Stephens* in his Annotations says, he had rather the Word ὃ was omitted. Parallel Places might be found in *Plato*, to justify in some Measure the Expression, as it stands. But were it necessary to make any Alteration, we should make no Doubt of supposing the Error lay in the last Words; nor scruple to read them thus, τὸ ὑπερέχον ΤΙ. For in the Sentence presently after, where this Similitude (as to the Manner of defining) is applied, *Plato* uses the same Way of expressing himself, thus; ἔτω δὲ φάμεν καὶ τὸ καλόν, ὃ καλὰ πάντα ἐς, — ΤΙ' αὖ εἶη.

which all great Things are Great, we should answer ⁷³, “it was by Surpassing Other Things of the same Kind.” For thus it is, that All Things are Great: and tho they may not All appear Great to Us, yet in as much as they surpass Others, Great of Necessity they must be. So is it, we say, with the Beautifull; it must be Something, by which Things are beautiful, whether they appear to be so or not. Now This cannot be the Becoming: for the Becoming causeth Things to appear more beautiful than they really are, according to ⁷⁴ Your Account of it; concealing the Truth of Things, and not suffering This ever to appear. But That, which causeth them to be really beautiful, as I just now said, whether they appear to be so or not, This 'tis Our Business to find out, and declare the Nature of it: for This it is, which is the Subject of our Search, if we are searching for the Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

⁷³ The Philosopher intends not in this place to illustrate by a Similitude the Difference between Real and Apparent; for the Definition of the true Nature of any other Thing would have served such a Purpose much better: but, as Things are best shown by shewing at the same time their *Contrarys*, his Intention is to illustrate in that Way the Nature of the Beautifull. For in defining Magnitude, and presenting to our Mind that Class of Things to which Magnitude belongs, that is, the *Infinite*, he shews us by this Contrast, that Beauty belongs to the *Opposite* Class of Things; and that the Beautifull itself, to which every beautiful Thing oweth its Beauty, must be That, which *bounds* Infinitude, *measures* Magnitude, and *equalises* or *proportions* all the Parts of all Things. See *Plato* in *Phileb.* p. 24, 25, and 64, of *Stephens's* Edition, which is That to which we always refer, in citing the Original.

⁷⁴ See the longer Speech of *Hippias* in Page 63.

H I P P I A S.

15

HIPPAS.

But the Becoming, Socrates, call'd Things both to be
and to appear beautiful, by Virtue of its Essence.

SOCRATES.

If so, then 'tis impossible for Things really beautiful, to
appear otherwise; in as much as there is present with them
the Cause of beautiful Appearance.

HIPPAS.

Admit it impossible.

SOCRATES.

Shall we admit This then, Hippas, that all Laws, and
Rules of Action, Manners, or Behaviour, truly beautiful,
are beautiful in common Estimation, and appear so
always to all Men? Or shall we not rather say quite the
Reverse, that Men are ignorant of their Beauty, and that
above all Things These are the Subjects of Controversy and
Contention, not only Private but Public, not only be-
tween Man and Man, but between different Communitys
and Civil States ⁷⁵?

HIPPAS.

⁷⁵ For a full Explication of this Passage we refer our Readers to
Plato's First Alcibiades, pag. 112. *Ed. Steph.* But more particularly we
recommend to their Perusal, upon this Occasion, a Conversation between
Socrates and *Hippas*, related by *Xenophon* in his *Memoirs of Socrates*:
because it confirms the Truth of many Circumstances in this Dia-
logue; and in particular, not only proves, that *Plato* drew the Charac-
ter of *Hippas* such as it really was; but that he attributed to *Socrates*
those Sentiments which were truly His. *Xenophon* introduces it thus,
with his usual Simplicity: " *I remember Socrates upon a certain*
" *Time*

HIPPIAS.

Thus indeed rather, Socrates, that in those Points Men are ignorant of the Beautifull.

SOCRATES.

But this would not be the Case, if those beautiful Things had the Appearance of Beauty, added to the Reality : And this Appearance would they have, if the Becoming were the Beautifull, and caused Things, as You say it does, both to be and to appear beautiful, bestowing on them Real and Apparent Beauty at the same time. Hence it follows, that if the Becoming should be That, by which Things are made truly

*“ Time holding Discourse with Hippias of Elis concerning the Rule or
 “ Standard of Right. The Occasion of it was this : Hippias, on his Ar-
 “ rival at Athens, where he had not been for a long Time before, hap-
 “ pened to meet Socrates, at a Time when he was in Conference with some
 “ other Persons, &c.”* The whole Conversation is too long to be here inserted. But the following Passage in it agrees with and illustrates this of Plato now before us. It follows a Boast made by Hippias, that concerning the Rule, by which to judge of Right and Wrong, he had some new Things to deliver, which it was impossible for Socrates or any other Person ever to controvert. *Νῆ τὴν Ἑρᾶν, ἔφη, μέγα λέγεις ἀγαθὸν εὐρηκέναι, εἰ παύσονται μὲν οἱ δικασαὶ δίχῃ ψηφίζόμενοι, παύσονται δ’ οἱ πολῖται περὶ τῶν δίκαιων ἀντιλέγοντές τε καὶ ἀντιδικῶντες καὶ ῥασιάζοντες, παύσονται δ’ αἱ πόλεις διαφερομέναι περὶ τῶν δίκαιων καὶ πολεμῆσαι.* By Juno, said Socrates, the Discovery, which you talk of having made, will be of great Service to the World, if it will put an End to all Diversity of Opinions amongst the Judges concerning What is agreeable to Justice : if there shall be no more Controversys, nor Suits at Law, nor Factions among the Citizens concerning what is Right and What is Wrong ; nor any more Differences or Wars between the Cities, occasioned by these very Questions. *Ξενοφ. Ἀπομνημ. βιβ. δ’.*

truly beautiful, then the Becoming must be the Beautifull which We are in Search of, not That by which Things are only made beautiful in Appearance. But if the Becoming should be That, by which Things are made beautiful only in Appearance, it cannot be the Beautifull which we are in Search of; for This bestows the Reality of Beauty. Nor is it in the Power of the Same Thing to cause the Appearance and the Reality, Both, not only in the Case of Beauty, but ⁷⁶ neither in any other Instance whatever. Let us chuse now, whether of these Two we shall take for the Becoming, That which causes the Appearance of Beauty, or That which causes the Reality.

HIPPIAS.

The Becoming, Socrates, I take it, must be That which causes the Appearance.

SOCRATES.

Fie upon it! Hippias. Our Discovery of the Beautifull is fled away, and hath escaped us. For the Becoming has turned out to be a Thing different from the Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

So it seems; and very unaccountably too.

SOCRATES.

⁷⁶ Here again we are led to that Universal Principle in the Nature of Things, from which they derive their *Stability*; a Principle congenial with *Reason*: and are taught to distinguish it from the Opposite Principle in Nature, thro which the Appearance of Things continually is *varying*; a Principle congenial with *Fancy*, Both being *Infinite*. Here we may discover the Source of that Difference between Real and Apparent: and thus our Steps are also conducted farther on, towards a Discovery of the truly Beautifull.

SOCRATES.

But however, my Friend, we must not give it up for lost. I have still some Hope left, that the Nature of the Beautiful may come forth into Light, and shew itself.

HIPPIAS.

With great Clearness, Socrates, beyond Doubt: for it is by no means difficult to find. I am positive, that, if I were to go aside for a little while, and consider by my Self, I should describe it to you with an Accuracy beyond that of any thing ever so accurate.

SOCRATES.

Ah! talk not, Hippias, in so high a Tone. You see what Trouble it has given us already; and I fear it should grow angry with us, and ⁷⁷ run away still farther than before. — But I talk idly: for You, I presume, will easily find it out, when you come to be alone. Yet in the Name of the Gods I conjure you, make the Discovery while I am with you: and, if it be agreeable to you, admit Me, as you did before, your Companion in the Search. If we find it together, 'twill be best of all: and, if we miss it in this Way of Joint Inquiry, I shall be contented, I hope, with my Disappointment, and You will depart and find better Success without any Difficulty. Besides, if we now find it, I shall not, you know, be troublesome afterwards, teizing you to tell me, what was the Event of that Inquiry by your Self,

⁷⁷ As much as to say, “ Reason and Truth are banished afar off by “ rash Arrogance and blind Positiveness.”

Self, and what was the Great Discovery which you had made. Now therefore consider, if you think This to be the Beautifull.—I say then, that it is—But pray observe, and give me all your Attention, for fear I should say any thing foolish or foreign to the Purpose :— Let This then be in our Account the Beautifull, That which is Useful.—I was induced to think it might be so by these Considerations. Beautiful, we say, are Eyes ; not those, which look as if they had not the Faculty of Sight ; but Such, as appear to have that Faculty strong, and to be Useful for the Purpose of Seeing. Do we not ?

HIPPIAS.

We do.

SOCRATES.

And the Whole Body also, do we not call it Beautiful with a View to its Utility ; One for the Race, Another for Wrestling ? So farther, thro all the Animal Kind, as a beautiful Horse, Cock, and Quail : in the same manner all Sorts of Domestic Utensils, and all the Conveniencys for Carriage abroad, be they Land-Vehicles, or Ships and Barges for the Sea : Instruments of Musick likewise, with the Tools and Instruments subservient to the Other Arts : to these you may please to add Moral Rules, and Laws : Every thing almost of any of these Kinds we call Beautiful upon the same Account ; respecting the End for which it was born, or framed, or instituted. In whatever Way it be useful, to whatever Purpose, and upon whatever Occasion ; agreeably

ably to These Circumstances we pronounce it Beautiful. But That, which is in every Respect uselefs, we declare totally void of Beauty. Are not You of this Opinion, Hippias?

HIPPIAS.

I am.

SOCRATES.

We are right therefore now in faying, that above all things the Useful proves to be the Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

Most certainly right, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

Now That, which is able to operate or effect any thing, is it not Useful so far as it has Power, and is Able? But That, which is Powerlefs and Unable, is it not Uselefs?

HIPPIAS.

Without Doubt.

SOCRATES.

Power then is Beautiful, and Want of Power is the Contrary.

HIPPIAS.

Quite right. And many Things there are, Socrates, which evince the Truth of this Conclusion: but particularly it holds good in Politicks. For the having Ability in Public Affairs, and Power in the State of which we are Members, is of all Things the most Beautiful: and Want
of

of such Power, with a total Defect of any such Ability, has of all Things the meanest Aspect.

SOCRATES.

You say well. In the Name of the Gods then, Hippias, does it not follow from all This, that Skill and Knowledge are of all Things the most Beautiful, and Want of them the Contrary?

HIPPIAS.

⁷⁸ Ay, what think you of This, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

Softly, my dear Friend : for I am under some Fears about the Rectitude of our present Conclusions.

HIPPIAS.

What are you afraid of, Socrates? For the Business of our Inquiry is now in a fair Way, and goes on as we could wish.

SOCRATES.

I would it were so. But let You and I consider together upon this Point. Could any Man execute a Work, of which he has neither Knowledge, nor any other Kind of Abilitys for the Performance?

HIPPIAS.

⁷⁸ *Hippias* is much flattered, and highly elevated, by this whole Description of the Beautifull now drawn; presuming himself interested deeply in it, on account of his supposed *Political Abilitys*, his *various Knowledge*, and that *Skill in Arts*, as well the Mechanic as the Polite, for which he is celebrated in the *Lesser Hippias*.

M

HIPPIAS.

By no Means. For how should a Man do That, for the doing of which he has no Abilitys?

SOCRATES.

Those People then who do wrong, and who err in the Execution of any thing, without erroneous or wrong Intention, would they ever have done or executed Things wrong, had they not been Able to do or execute them in that Manner?

HIPPIAS.

Clearly they would not.

SOCRATES.

But the Able are able thro their Abilitys: for it is not Inability, which any way enables them.

HIPPIAS.

Certainly, not.

SOCRATES.

And All, who do any thing, are able to do what they do.

HIPPIAS.

True.

SOCRATES.

And all Men do many more wrong Things, than right; and commit Errors, from their Infancy; without intending to do wrong, or to err.

HIPPIAS.

The Fact is so.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Well then : those Abilitys, and those Means or Instruments, which help and are useful in the doing or executing any thing wrong, whether shall we say They are beautiful? or are they not rather far from being so?

HIPPIAS.

Far from it, in My Opinion, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

The Able and Useful therefore, Hippias, in Our Opinion, it seems, no longer is the Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

Still it is so, Socrates, if it has Power to do what is right, or is Useful to a Good Purpose.

SOCRATES.

That Account is then rejected, that the Able and Usefull simply and absolutely is the Beautifull. But the Thought, Hippias, which our Mind laboured with, and wanted to exprefs, was This, that the Usefull and Able for the producing of any Good, That is the Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

This indeed seems to be the Case.

SOCRATES.

But the Thing thus described is the Profitable. Is it not?

HIPPIAS.

It is.

THE GREATER

SOCRATES.

From hence then is derived the Beauty of Bodys, the Beauty of Moral Precepts, of Knowledge and Wisdom, and of all those Things just now enumerated ; they are Beautiful, because Profitable.

HIPPIAS.

Evidently so.

SOCRATES.

The Profitable therefore, Hippias, should seem to be Our Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

Beyond all Doubt, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

But the Profitable is That, which effects or produces Good.

HIPPIAS.

True.

SOCRATES.

And the Efficient is no other Thing than the Cause. Is it?

HIPPIAS.

Nothing else.

SOCRATES.

The Cause of Good therefore is the Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

Right.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Now the Cause, Hippias, is a Thing different from That, which it causes. For the Cause can by no means be the Cause of its Self. Consider it thus : Did not the Cause appear to be the Efficient ?

HIPPIAS.

Clearly.

SOCRATES.

And by the Efficient no other Thing is effected, than That which is produced or generated ; but This is not the Efficient itself.

HIPPIAS.

You are in the Right.

SOCRATES.

Is not That then, which is produced or generated One Thing, and the Efficient a Thing different ?

HIPPIAS.

It is.

SOCRATES.

The Cause therefore is not the Cause of its Self ; but of That, which is generated or produced by it.

HIPPIAS.

Without Doubt.

SOCRATES.

If the Beautifull be then the Cause of Good, Good itself must be produced or generated by the Beautifull. And for this Reason, it should seem, we cultivate and study Prudence,

dence, and every other fair Virtue, because their Production and their Issue is well worth our Study and our Care, as being Good its Self. Thus are we likely to find from our Inquirys, that the Beautifull, as it stands related to Good, has the Nature of a Kind of Father.

HIPPIAS.

The very Case, Socrates : You are perfectly right in what you say.

SOCRATES.

Am I not right also in This, that neither is the Father the Son, nor is the Son the Father ?

HIPPIAS.

Right in That also.

SOCRATES.

Nor is the Cause the Production, nor the Production on the other hand the Cause.

HIPPIAS.

Very right.

SOCRATES.

By Jove then, my Friend, neither is the Beautifull Good, nor is the Good Beautiful. Do you think 'tis possible it should be so ? Is it consistent with what we have said, and are agreed in ?

HIPPIAS.

By Jove, I think not.

SOCRATES.

Would this Opinion please us then, and should we chuse
to

to abide by it, that the Beautifull is not Good, nor the Good Beautiful?

HIPPIAS.

By Jove, No; it would not please Me at all.

SOCRATES.

⁷⁹ Well said, by Jupiter, Hippias: and Me it pleases the least of Any of those Descriptions or Accounts, which we have hitherto given, of the Beautifull.

HIPPIAS.

⁷⁹ According to the Doctrine of *Socrates* and *Plato*, the *Same* Persons, Things, and Actions, are in the true Sense both καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ, *Beautiful* and *Good*: and the *Ideas* of *Good* and of *Beauty* so intirely coincide, and concur in *One*, that not only the Beautifull is Good, and the Good Beautiful; but also, that the Sovereign Beauty, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, is the Source of all Good; and the Sovereign Good, αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, is the Source of all Beauty: Truths, which our Intelligent Readers may be able to comprehend, by considering the latter Part of the *Philebus*, and the Sixth Book of the *Republick*. Consonant to This is That Doctrine of the *Stoicks*, that *the Beautifull and the Good are Equivalent*, ἰσοδυναμεῖ, that is, have the same Force and Power. See *Diog. Laert.* L. 7. p. 427. Edit. *Wetstein*. That excellent Critic and Annotator, *Menage*, agrees with *Clemens* of *Alexandria* in observing, that These Philosophers derived all their Opinions of this Kind from *Plato*. See *Menag.* in *Laert.* p. 300. According to *Aristotle* indeed, the Ideas of *Good* and *Beauty* are *different*; because “*Good* he says, is “always found in *Action*, (or Operation,) and *Beauty* is found ALSO in “Things *Unmoved and Stable*;” Τὸ μὲν [ἀγαθόν] γὰρ αἰεὶ ἐν πράξει, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ΚΑΙ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις. *Metaphysic.* L. 13. C. 3. But in This he is so far from being opposite to the Doctrine of his Master, that he could no way better have illustrated the Platonic Doctrine of a SOVEREIGN MIND; *Stable in its Self, yet the fountain of all Motion; and operating Good perpetually, by a perpetual Efflux of Form and Beauty.*

HIPPIAS.

So I perceive.

SOCRATES.

That Definition of it therefore, which we thought just now the most excellent of all, that the Profitable, the Usefull and Able to produce some Good or other, was that Beautiful, is in Danger of losing all its Credit with Us; and of appearing, if possible, more ridiculous than our former Accounts of it, where we reckoned the Maiden to be the Beautiful, or any other Particular, whose Defect we have before discovered.

HIPPIAS.

It seems so indeed.

SOCRATES.

And for my own Part, Hippias, I see no Way, where to turn my self any more; but am absolutely at a Loss. Have You any thing to say?

HIPPIAS.

Not at present. But, as I said just now, after a little Considering, I am certain, I shall find it out.

SOCRATES.

But I fear, so extreme is my Desire of knowing it, that I shall not be able to wait Your Time. Besides, I have just met with, as I imagine, a fair Kind of Opening to the Discovery. For consider That which gives us Delight and Joy, (I speak not of all Kinds of Pleasure, but of That only which arises in us thro the Hearing and the Sight,) whe-

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ther

ther we should not call This the Beautifull. ⁸⁰ And how, indeed, could we dispute it? Seeing, that 'tis the Beautifull of our own Species, Hippias, with the Sight of whom we are so delighted: that we take Pleasure in viewing all beautiful Works of the Loom or Needle; and whatever is well painted, carved, or moulded. 'Tis the same with the Hearing: for well-measured Sounds and all musical Harmony, the Beautys of Prosaic Composition also, with pretty Fables and well-framed Storys, have the like Effect upon us, to be agreeable, to be delightful, and to charm. Were we to give therefore that petulant and saucy Fellow this Answer — “ Noble Sir, the Beautifull is That, which gives us “ Pleasure thro the Hearing and thro the Sight,” do you think we should not restrain his Insolence?

HIPPIAS.

For My Part, Socrates, I think the Nature of the Beautifull now truly well explained.

SOCRATES.

But what shall we say of the Beauty of Manners, and of Laws, Hippias? Shall we say it gives us Pleasure thro the Hearing, or thro the Sight? or is it to be ranked under some other Kind?

HIPPIAS.

⁸⁰ In the *Greek* we read thus, Πῶς τὸ ἄρ' ἀν' ἀγωνιζοίμεθα; But, since we know of no Precedent in *Plato* for the Use of two Interrogatives in this Manner, that is, without the Conjunction ἢ (*or*) between them; we suppose it ought to be read, either Πῶς ΓΑΡ ἀν' ἀγωνιζοίμεθα; or ΠΡΟ'Σ τὸ ΓΑΡ κ. τ. λ. *To what Purpose should we contend about it?*

HIPPIAS.

Perhaps the Man may not think of This.

SOCRATES.

By the Dog, Hippias, but That Man would, of whom I stand in Awe the most of all Men; and before whom I should be most ashamed if I trifled, and pretended to utter something of great Importance, when in Reality I talked idly, and spoke nothing to the Purpose.

HIPPIAS.

Who is He?

SOCRATES.

Socrates, the Son of Sophroniscus; who would no more suffer Me to throw out such Random-Speeches, or so readily decide on Points which I had not thorowly sifted, than he would allow me to talk of Things which I am ignorant of, as if I knew them.

HIPPIAS.

Why really I must own, that to Me my self, since You have started the Observation, the Beauty of Laws seems referable to another Kind.

SOCRATES.

Softly, Hippias. For, tho we have fallen into fresh Difficultys, equal to our former ones, about the Nature of the Beautifull, we are in a fair Way, I think, of extricating our selves out of them.

HIPPIAS.

How so, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

I will tell you how the Matter appears to Me : whether or no there be any Thing Material in what I say, You will consider. The Beauty then of Laws and of Manners, I imagine, may possibly be found not altogether abstracted from⁸¹ that Kind of Sensation, which arises in the Soul thro the Senses of Hearing and of Sight. But let us abide a while by this Definition, that “What gives us Pleasure thro these Senses is the Beautifull,” without bringing the Beauty of Laws the least into Question. Suppose then, that either the Man of whom I am speaking, or any Other, should interrogate us after this Manner ; “For what Reason, Hippias and Socrates, have you separated from the Pleasant in General that Species of it, in which you say consists the Beautifull ; denying the Character of Beautiful to those Species of Pleasure which belong to the Other Senses, to the Pleasures of Taste, the Joys of Venus, and all others of the same Class ? Do you refuse them the Character of Pleasant also, and maintain that no Pleasure neither is to be found in these Sensations, or in Any thing beside Seeing and Hearing ?” Now, Hippias, What shall we say to this ?

HIPPIAS.

By all Means, Socrates, we must allow Pleasure to be found also in these Sensations ; a Pleasure very exquisite.

N 2

SOCRATES.

⁸¹ Meaning, that in these Cases also it consists in *Proportion, Order,* and *Harmony* ; those of a *Civil Society* in the First Case ; in the Other, those of a Man’s own *Life and Actions*.

SOCRATES.

“ Since These Sensations then afford Pleasure, will he say,
 “ no less than those Others, ⁸² Why do you deprive them
 “ of the Name of Beautiful, and rob them of their proper
 “ Share of Beauty ? ” — “ Because there is no one, who would
 “ not laugh at us, we shall answer, were we to call Eating a
 “ Beautiful Thing, instead of a Pleasant; or the smelling sweet
 “ Odours, were we to say, not that ’twas Pleasant, but that
 “ ’twas Beautiful. Above all, in Amorous Enjoyments, all the
 “ World would contend, there was the highest Degree of the
 “ Sweet and Pleasant; but that whoever was engaged in
 “ them should take Care not to be seen, the Act of Love be-
 “ ing far from agreeable to the Sight, or Beautiful.” — Now,
 Hippias, when we have thus answered, he may reply per-
 haps in this Manner — “ I apprehend perfectly well the
 “ Reason, why you have always been ashamed to call These
 “ Pleasures Beautiful; ’tis because they seem not so to Men.
 “ But the Question, which I asked you, was not — What
 “ seemed Beautiful to the Multitude; but — What was so
 “ in Reality.” — Then shall We answer, I presume, only
 by repeating our last Hypothesis, that “ We our Selves give
 “ the Name of Beautiful to That Part only of the Pleasant,
 “ which

⁸² This Sentence is ill pointed by *H. Stephens*, in two Places: in the First of which, at least, we think it was done with Design; so as to give us this Construction — *What? Do you deprive, &c.* That learned Editor was fond of doing the same in many other Sentences; and particularly in one, a little before this, he has in the Margin proposed the like Alteration.

H I P P I A S.

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“ which ariseth in us by Means of our Sight and Hearing.”— But have You any thing to say, which may be of Service to our Argument? Shall we answer Aught besides, Hippias?

HIPPIAS.

To what He has said, Socrates, 'tis unnecessary to make any farther Answer.

SOCRATES.

“ Very well now, will He say: If the Pleasant then, arising thro the Sight and Hearing, be the Beautifull; Whatever Portion of the Pleasant happens not to be This, 'tis clear it cannot be the Beautifull.”— Shall we admit this?

HIPPIAS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

“ Is That Portion of the Pleasant then, he will say, which arises thro the Sight, the Same with That which arises thro the Sight and Hearing? or is That, which arises thro the Hearing, the Same with That which arises thro the Hearing and the Sight? ”—“ That which ariseth in us thro Either of those Senses alone, and not thro the Other, we shall answer, is by no means the Same with That which arises thro them Both. For this seems to be the Import of Your Question. But Our Meaning was, that Each of these Species of the Pleasant was, by its self separately, the Beautifull; and that they were
“ also,

“ also, Both of them together, the Same Beautifull.”—
Should we not answer so?

HIPPAS.

By all Means.

SOCRATES.

“ Does any Species of the Pleasant then, he will say,
“ differ from any Other, whatever it be, so far as it is
“ Pleasant? Observe; I ask you not, if One Pleasure is
“ greater or less than Another; or whether it is more or
“ less a Pleasure: but whether there is any Difference be-
“ tween the Pleasures in this Respect, that One of them is
“ Pleasure, the Other not Pleasure.” — In Our Opinion
there is no Difference between them, of this Kind. Is
there any?

HIPPAS.

I agree with You, there is not any.

SOCRATES.

“ For some other Reason therefore, he will say it is,
“ than because they are Pleasures, that you have selected
“ These Species of Pleasure from the rest, and given Them
“ the Preference. You have discerned, that there is Some-
“ thing or Other in them, by which they differ from the
“ rest; with a View to which Difference you distinguish
“ them by the Epithet of Beautiful. Now the Pleasure,
“ which ariseth in us thro the Sense of Seeing, deriveth not
“ its Beauty from any Thing⁸³ peculiarly belonging to that
“ Sense.

⁸³ That is, not from *Colour*, or from *Figure*; but from the due
Degree and proper *Disposition* of the Colours; or from the just *Size*,

fit
2

“ Sense. For if This were the Cause of its being beautiful, that Other Pleasure which arises thro the Hearing never would be beautiful, as not partaking of That, which is peculiar to the Sense of Seeing.”—“ You are in the Right ;” shall we say ?

HIPP I A S.

We will.

SOCRATES.

“ So neither, on the other hand, does the Pleasure, produced in us thro the Sense of Hearing, derive its Beauty from any Circumstance, which ⁸⁴ peculiarly attends the Hearing. For in that Case the Pleasure, produced thro Seeing, would not be Beautiful, ⁸⁵ as not partaking of
“ That,

fit *Arrangement*, and *Proportion* of the Parts ; in a Word, from *Measure*, *Harmony*, and *Order*.

⁸⁴ That is, not from *Sound* ; but from its just *Degree*, and proper *Tone* ; from the *Concord* of Sounds and their *orderly Succession* ; from those *Numbers* and *Proportions*, by which Sound is *measured*.

⁸⁵ The *Greek* of this Passage is thus printed, ἐκὼν ἔτι γε δι’ ἀκοῆς ἡδονή. So, in the Speech of *Socrates*, immediately preceding, where the Reasoning is the same, only the Terms inverted, we read ἐκὼν ἔτι γε δι’ ὀψεως ἡδονή. In both Passages the Sense is thus very lame. *Stephens* proposes This Reading, ἐκὼν ἔτι γε κ. τ. λ. which is found, he says, in some old Manuscript. But the Sense is very little amended by this Alteration. *Cornarius*, whether from that Manuscript in the *Hassenstein* Library, which he was favoured with the Use of, or from his own Sagacity, has recovered a Part, at least, of the true Reading ; thus, ἐκ ἔσα ἔτι γε κ. τ. λ. For, that we ought to read ἐκ ἔσα, there can be no Doubt ; the Argumentation shews it sufficiently : but this Amendment may, we imagine, be improved by reading, ἐκ ἔσα ἢ γε δι’ ἀκοῆς (and in the former Passage δι’ ὀψεως) ἡδονή.

“ That, which is peculiar to the Sense of Hearing.” —
Shall we allow, Hippias, that the Man is in the Right,
when he says this?

HIPPIAS.

Allow it.

SOCRATES.

“ But Both these Pleasures now are Beautiful, you say.”
For so we say: do we not?

HIPPIAS.

We do.

SOCRATES.

“ There is Something in them therefore, the Same in
“ Both, to which they owe their Beauty, a Beauty Com-
“ mon to them Both. There is Something, I say, which
“ they have belonging to them Both in Common, and
“ also in Particular to Each. For otherwise they would
“ not, Both and Each of them, be Beautifull.” — Answer
now, as if you were speaking to Him.

HIPPIAS.

I answer then, that, in My Opinion, ⁸⁶ you give a true
Account of the Matter.

SOCRATES.

⁸⁶ In the Edition of *Plato* by *Stephens* we read the *Greek* of this Passage thus, ἐμὸν δοκεῖ εἶχεν, ὡς λέγει; and by a Marginal Note we find, that 'twas so printed by Design. But the Editions of *Aldus* and of *Walder* give us the last Word, λέγεις, which is certainly right: for in reading λέγει, *Hippias* is made to speak *of* the Man, not *to* him, contrary to the Intention of *Plato*, expressed in the preceding Sentence.

SOCRATES.

Should there be any Circumstance therefore, attending on Both these Pleasures of the Sight and Hearing taken together ; yet if the Same Circumstance attend not on Each taken separately ; ⁸⁷ or should Any attend on Each separately, yet not on Both together ; they cannot derive their Beauty from This Circumstance.

HIPPIAS.

How is it possible, Socrates, that any Circumstance whatever, which attends on Neither of them, should ever attend on Both ?

SOCRATES.

Do you think This impossible ?

HIPPIAS.

I must be quite ignorant, I own, in Things of this Sort ; as I am quite unused to such Kind of Disputes.

SOCRATES.

You jest, Hippias. But I am in Danger perhaps of fancying that I see Something, so circumstanced, as You aver to be impossible.

HIPPIAS.

⁸⁷ In the *Greek* Text, after this first Part of the Sentence, Εἰ ἄρα τὶ αὐταὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ ἀμφότεραι πεπνύθασιν, ἑκάτερα δὲ μὴ, there is a manifest Omission of the following Words, ἢ ἑκάτερα μὲν, ἀμφότεραι δὲ μὴ, as will appear afterwards in Page 114, where *Socrates* refers to this very Sentence.

HIPPIAS.

You are in no Danger of any such Fancy, Socrates : but are pleased to look askint purposely ; that is all.

SOCRATES.

Many Things, I assure you, of that Kind appear to Me very evident. But I give no Credit to them ; because they are not evident to You, who have raised a larger Fortune than any Man living, by the Profession of Philosophy ; and because they appear only to Me, who have never in that Way earned a Farthing. I have some Suspicion, however, that possibly you are not in Earnest with me, but design to impose upon me : so Many Things of that Kind do I perceive so plainly.

HIPPIAS.

No one will know better than your Self, Socrates, whether I am in Earnest with you or not, if you will but begin and tell me, What those Things are which you perceive so plainly. You will soon see, that you talk idly. For you will never find a Circumstance attending us Both together, which attends separately neither You nor Me.

SOCRATES.

How say you, Hippias ? But perhaps You have Reason on your Side, and I may not apprehend it. Let me therefore explain to you my Meaning more distinctly. To Me then it appears, that some Circumstance of Being, which attends not My Individual Person, nor Yours, Something which

which belongs neither to Me, nor to You, may yet possibly belong to Both of us, and attend Both our Persons taken together: ⁸⁸ and on the other hand, that certain Circumstances of Being, not attending us Both taken together, may attend Each of our separate and single Persons.

HIPPAS.

You tell me of Prodigys still greater, I think, ⁸⁹ now, Socrates, than those which you told me of just before. For consider; if Both of us are Honest Man, must not Each of us be Honest? or, supposing Each of us Dishonest, must we not Both be so? if Both are sound and well, is not Each also? or ⁹⁰ should Each of us now be tired of any thing, or come off

⁸⁸ The *Greek* of this Passage is thus printed; ἕτερα δ' αὖ, ὃ ἀμφοτέροι πεπόνθαμεν εἶναι, ταῦτα ἑδέτερον εἶναι ἡμῶν. By which the Sense of this Part of the Sentence is made exactly the *Same* with that of the former Part. But the Words [ἕτερα δ' αὖ] plainly indicate, that Something *different* is intended. And what This precisely is, will appear in the Beginning of Page 112; where this Sentence of *Socrates* is repeated in other Words and ridiculed by *Hippias*. In Conformity with which undoubted Meaning of this Passage, we are obliged to make an Alteration here in the *Greek* Text, and to read it thus, ἕτερα δ' αὖ, ὃ ΜΗ' ἀμφοτέροι πεπόνθαμεν εἶναι, ταῦτα ἑκάτερον εἶναι ἡμῶν.

⁸⁹ Instead of αὖ, we presume, that we ought here to read οὖν, as opposed to ὀλίγον πρότερον at the End of the Sentence.

⁹⁰ Whoever has any Taste for Humour, cannot fail of observing the Drollery, with which *Hippias* is here made to confess, in what Condition he finds himself; tired of the Conversation upon a Subject, the Tendency of which he is ignorant of; confused over and over; and at length quite puzzled with a seeming Paradox. His sly Insinuation also here, that *Socrates* was in the same Condition with Himself; and his Other, just before, that *Socrates* reasoned unfairly, like Himself and

off ill in some Combat between us, or be amazed and confounded, or be affected any other Way, would not Both of us be in the Same Plight? To go farther; in case that we had, Both of us⁹¹, Images of our selves, made of Gold, or Silver, or Ivory; or that Both of us, if you will give me Leave to say it, were Generous, or Wise, or Honourable; did Both of us happen to be Old, or Young; or to be possessed of any other Human Quality; or to be in any Condition whatever, incident to Human Life; must not Each of us be, of absolute Necessity, that very same Kind of Man, and in those very same Circumstances?

SOCRATES.

Beyond all Doubt.

HIPPIAS.

his Brother-Sophists; these Strokes of Humour will be obvious to All, who are acquainted with *Plato's* artful and humourous Way of Writing. But Those, who have a Delicacy of Taste to discern the several Kinds of Humour, will have an additional Pleasure in distinguishing the coarse Sarcasms and Buffoon-Manner of *Hippias*, both in this Speech and before in Page 72, from the genteel and fine *Raillery* always used by *Socrates*.

⁹¹ The following Cases are suggested to *Hippias* by his Vanity. For the *Athenians* having, not long before, been so greatly taken with the Wisdom and Eloquence of *Gorgias*, as to set up a Statue of him, made of Gold, in the Temple of *Apollo*; 'tis probable, that *Hippias* flattered himself with Hopes of the like Honour: and for fear perhaps that *Socrates* might have been offended at the Liberty which He had just taken with him, thought it expedient to soothe him with the same Fancys; thus mixing Flattery with Affronts, as it is usual with Men of His Character. From the Expression also used in the Close of these Instances, we think it appears farther, that *Plato* had a secret Reference to the Gods of his Country in this Passage, and contrived it so as to be subservient to his Design in this latter Part of the Dialogue.

HIPPIAS.

But You, Socrates, with your Companions and Fellow-Disputants, consider not Things Universally, or in the Whole. Thus you take the Beautifull and chop it into Pieces : and every Thing in Nature, which happens to be the Subject of your Discourse, you serve in the same Manner, ⁹² splitting and dividing it. Hence you are unacquainted with ⁹³ the Greatness of Things, with Bodys of Infinite

⁹² It was the Manner of *Socrates* in Conversation, whatever was the Subject of it, to ascend to the Consideration of the Thing in *General*; to divide it into its several *Species*; and to distinguish each Species from the rest by some peculiar *Character*, in order to come at the *definite* and *precise* Nature of the very Thing in Question.

⁹³ All Things in Nature, distinguished into their several *Kinds*, *General* and *Specific*, are, according to the Platonic Doctrine, the *Unfolding* of *Universal Form and Beauty*. That this *Principle*, which every where *bounds* every Part of Nature, may appear in a brighter Light; That *Opposite* Principle, *Infinitude* or *the Infinite*, is here exhibited to View : and amongst the various Representations given of it by the Antient Physiologists, that of *Anaxagoras* is singled out from the rest; probably for this Reason, because it affords the strongest Contrast : the Infinite, according to His Doctrine, being, if the Expression may be allowed us, *Infinite the most of all*; or, as *Simplicius* styles it, ἀπειράνως ἀπειρον, *Infinitely Infinite*. A Summary Account of which may be necessary to a full Comprehension of the Passage before us.—Down to the Time of *Anaxagoras*, all the Philosophers agreed in the Doctrine of *One Infinite, Material, Principle of Things*. This was held by *Pythagoras* and his Followers to be Nothing else than a *Common Subject-Matter* of the *Four Elements*, or primary Forms of Nature : from the various *Combinations* of which Four, in various *Proportions*, are made all other Natural Bodys. By the Disciples of *Anaximander* it was supposed to have *Form*, tho' *Indistinct* and *Indeterminate*; out of which all Contrarieties

finite Magnitude, thro the Natural Continuity of Being. And now so much are You a Stranger to the Vastness of this

View

trarietys arose through *Separation*. Others imagined the Infinite to have some *Determinate* and *Distinct Form*: And These again were divided. For Some, at the Head of whom was *Thales*, thought it a *Watery Fluid*, or Moisture, replete with the *Seeds* of all Things; Every thing being produced from some *Seminal Principle* by *Evolution* and *Dilatation*, thro the *Action* of the *Moist Fluid*. In the Opinion of Others, of *Anaximenes* and His School, it was a Kind of *Air*; from the *Rarefaction* and *Condensation* of which were produced other Great and Uniform Kinds of Body throughout the Universe, by Mixture making the Lesser, the Composite. Such were the most ancient Accounts of the *Material Cause* of Things, and their Origin out of the *One Infinite*. But *Anaxagoras* struck out a new Road to the Knowledge of Nature. For, denying the Origin of Things from any *Infinite One*, whether determinate or indeterminate, formed or unformed; denying the Existence of any *Primary* or *Elementary Bodys*; denying all *Essential Change* in Nature, even any *Alteration* in any Thing, except such as arose from *Local Motion*, or the *shifting of Parts* from one Body to another; He taught, that the *Corpuscula*, or component Parts of Things, were always what they are at present: for that the Forms of Nature, *Innumerable* in their *Kinds*, were composed of *Similar* and *Homogeneous* Parts. Farther he taught, that Each of these minute Bodys, tho *Homogeneous* with That *Whole* of which it was a *Part*, was itself composed of Parts *Dis-similar* and *Heterogeneous*, *infinite* in *Number*; there being *no Bounds* in Nature to *Minuteness*: that these *Heterogeneous Bodys*, infinitely minute, were of *all Kinds*; so that *All things*, in some Measure, were *together every where*; and Each of those *Corpuscula*, apparently so Uniform, contained all the various Principles of Things: that the *Predominance* of some *One* of these *Principles*, that is, the *Quantity* of it exceeding that of the rest, constituted the *Nature* of each minute Body; fitting it also for Union with *Bodys Homogeneous* to it, that is, with other Bodys, where the *same Principle* was *predominant*: that, All things being in

per-

View of the Universe, as to imagine that any Thing, whether Being or Circumstance of Being, can possibly belong

to *perpetual Motion*, which first began, and is continued on by *Active Mind*, disposing *All things*; the Predominance of each Principle was continually *fluctuating* and *changing*; the *Destruction* of the *present* Predominance was the *Dissolution* of each temporary Being; and a *new Predominance*, That of some other Principle, was the *Generation* of what we call a *New Being*. For Instance; whereas every *Drop of Water* contains *Aerial Particles* within it; as soon as these begin to *predominate* in any Watery Drop, it rises in *Air*; and receiving there an *Increase* of the *Aerial Principle*, by Degrees becomes *united* to the *Air*. So, *Air* refines into *Fire*, and thickens into *Water*, thro the *Over-powering* of the One or the Other of these *Neighbour-Principles*, with which it ever had maintained a *secret Correspondence*. So, the *Earthy Particles*, accumulated in the *Water*, produce *Mud*; by Degrees hardening into *Earth*; thence into various *Mineral Bodys*, *Stones*, and *Metals*, according to the *Kind* of *Earth predominant* in each Place thro Motion. These again crumble into *Common Earth*: from which all the various *Vegetable Beings* arise in like Manner, *nourished* and *increased* by the *Accumulation* of *Particles Homogeneous*; and into which they fall and are dissolved again, thro the *Decay* and *Diminution* of those Particles, whose superior *Number* and *Strength* to resist Others of a different Kind had before constituted the Being. In the same Manner, all the Parts of Animals, whether Muscular, Membranous, Bony, or any other, receive *Nourishment* or admit *Decay*, by *Addition* or *Subtraction* of Homogeneous Particles. It will be easy for a Thinking Mind to pursue *Nature*, acting in *This Method*, according to *Anaxagoras*, thro All things. The Principles of Things are thus made Infinite, not only in Number and Minuteness; but there being also a Continuity of *ὁμοιομέτεια* or Homogeneous Particles, *ἀπὸ συνεχιζόμεναι*, thro the Universe, Every *ὁμοιομέτεια*, that is, Every Kind of Things, is a *Natural Body*, *Infinite in Magnitude*, and infinitely divisible into such Parts as are wholly agreeing in their Kind. *Simplicius*, in his *Commentary* on the *Physics* of *Aristotle*, to which inestimable Magazine of ancient Physiology we are indebted for

to Both those Pleasures which we are speaking of, taken together, yet not belong to Each of them; or, on the other hand, may belong to Each, without belonging to Both. So void of Thought and Consideration, so simple, and so narrow-minded are You and your Companions.

SOCRATES.

Such is the Lot of Our Condition, Hippias. 'Tis not what a Man will, says the Common Proverb, but what he can. However, You are always kind in assisting us with Your Instructions. For but just now, before You had taught me better, how simple my Mind was, and how narrow my Way of Thinking, I shall give you still a plainer Proof, by telling you what were my Thoughts upon the present Subject;—if You will give me Leave.

HIPPIAS.

You will tell them to One who knows them already, Socrates. For I am well acquainted with the different Ways of Thinking, and know the Minds of All who philosophise. Notwithstanding, if it will give Pleasure to your Self, you may tell me.

SOCRATES.

for the chief Part of this Note, draws the same Conclusion: his Words are these; ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων πρόχειρον συννοεῖν, ὅτι εἰ πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς ἐκρίνεται, καὶ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν ἔσιν, ὃ μόνον τὸ πᾶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕκαστον, ὃ τῷ πλῆθει μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μεγέθει, ἀπειράκις ἀπειρον ἔσαι. *From the Account now given it is easy to conceive, that if Every Thing is made out of Every Thing by Separation, and All Things are in All, not only the Universe, but every Kind of Things therein, is Infinitely Infinite, not only in the Number of its Parts, but also in Magnitude. See Aristot. Physic. L. 1. C. 4. and L. 3. C. 4. Simplic. Com. fol. 6. and 105. b. 106. a.*

SOCRATES.

To Me, I confess, it will. You must know then, my Friend, that I was so foolish, till I had received from You better Information, as to imagine of my Self and You, that Each of us was One Person; and that This, which Each of us was, Both of us were not, as not being One, but Two Persons. — Such a Simpleton was I! — But from You have I now learnt, that if Both of us are Two Persons, Each of us also by Necessity is Two; and that, if Each of us be but One, it follows by the same Necessity, that Both of us are no More. For, by Reason of the Continuity of Being, according to Hippias, 'tis impossible it should be otherwise; ⁹⁴ Each of us being of Necessity whatever Both of us are, and Both whatever Each. And now, persuaded by You to believe these Things, here I sit me down, and rest contented. But first inform me, Hippias, whether we are One Person, You and I together; or whether You are Two Persons, and I Two Persons.

HIPPIAS.

What mean you, Socrates?

SOCRATES.

⁹⁴ The Words of *Anaxagoras*, as cited by *Simplicius*, pag. 106. b. really favour such a Conclusion. For he expressly says, that his System of the Continuity of Being included τὰ πᾶσι καὶ τὰς ἕξαις, *every Thing which any Being had, or suffered*: that is, in Scholastic Language, all the *Property*s and *Accidents* of Being; or, in Common Speech, the *Condition* and *Circumstances* of Things; which, as he tells us, inseparably follow and attend their several Natures.

SOCRATES.

The very Thing, which I say. For I am afraid of entering with you into a farther Discussion of the Subject, because you fall into a Passion with me, whenever you say any thing which you take to be Important. To venture for once, however; tell me—Is not Each of us One? and is not the being One a Circumstance attendant upon our Being?

HIPPIAS.

Without Doubt.

SOCRATES.

If Each of us then be One, Each of us must be also Odd. Or think you that One is not an Odd Number?

HIPPIAS.

I think it is.

SOCRATES.

Are we Odd Both together then, notwithstanding that we are Two?

HIPPIAS.

That is absurd, Socrates.

SOCRATES.

But Both together, we are Even. Is it not so?

HIPPIAS.

Certainly.

SOCRATES.

Now, because Both of us together we are Even, does it follow from thence that Each of us singly too is Even?

HIPPIAS.

HIPPIAS.

Certainly, not.

SOCRATES.

There is not therefore such an absolute Necessity, as you said just now there was, that whatever Both of us were, Each should be the Same ; and that whatever Each of us was, the Same must we be, Both.

HIPPIAS.

Not in ⁹⁵ such Cases as These, I acknowledge ; but still it holds True in ⁹⁶ Such as I enumerated before.

SOCRATES.

That suffices, Hippias. I am contented with This Acknowledgement, that it appears to be so in Some Cases, but in Others otherwise. For, if you remember from whence the present Dispute arose, I said, that the Pleasures of Sight and Hearing could not derive their Beauty from any Circumstance, which attended on Each, yet not on Both ; neither from Any, which attended on Both, yet not on Each :

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but

⁹⁵ Meaning Individual Beings, or the Particulars of any Species ; considered meerly as Such, without any Accidental or Adventitious Quality, by which One is distinguished from Another : Thus, *John* is One (Individual) Man, or Animal or Being ; *Thomas* is Another. To These only Number is applicable ; together with such Appendages of Being and of Number, as extend to All things : such as being the Same or Different, One or Many.

⁹⁶ Meaning the Kinds of any Thing, whether General or Specific ; such Qualitys also and other Circumstances, of which Many do or may partake : for Instance, Animal, Vegetable ; Tree, Flower ; Wood, Stone ; Air, Water ; Red or Yellow, Round or Square, Hot or Cold, Above or Below, Still or in Motion.

but that the Beauty of them was derived from Something which they had, belonging to Both of them in Common, and in Particular to Each. And This I said, because You had admitted the Beauty of them Both together, and of Each separately. From which I drew this Consequence, that they were indebted for their Beauty to some Being, whose Presence still followed and attended on them Both; and not to Such, as fell short of Either. And I continue still in the same Mind. But answer me, as if we were now beginning this last Inquiry afresh. Pleasure thro the Sight and Pleasure thro the Hearing then being supposed Beautiful, Both of them and Each; tell me, does not the Cause of their Beauty follow and attend on Both of them taken together, and upon Each also considered separate?

HIPPIAS.

Without Doubt.

SOCRATES.

Is it then, because they are Pleasures, Both and Each of them, that they are Beautiful? Or, if This were the Cause, would not the Pleasures of the other Senses be Beautiful, as well as These? For it appeared, that they were Pleasures, as well as these: — if you remember.

HIPPIAS.

I remember it well.

SOCRATES.

But because These Pleasures arise in us thro Sight and Hearing, 'This we assigned for the Cause of their being Beautiful.

HIPPIAS.

HIPPAS.

It was so determined.

SOCRATES.

Observe now, whether I am right or not : for as well as I can remember, we agreed, that the Pleasant was the Beautiful ; not, the Pleasant in General ; but those Species of it only, which are produced thro Sight and Hearing.

HIPPAS.

It is true.

SOCRATES.

Does not this Circumstance then attend on Both these Pleasures taken together ? and is it not wanting to Each of them alone ? For by no Means is Either of them alone, as was said before, produced thro Both those Senses. Both of them are indeed thro Both, but not so is Each. Is This true ?

HIPPAS.

It is.

SOCRATES.

They are not beautiful therefore, Either of them, from any Circumstance which attends on Either by its Self. For we cannot argue from Either to Both ; nor from what Each is separately, infer what they Both are jointly. So that we may assert the Joint Beauty of Both these Pleasures : according to our present Hypothesis of the Beautiful : but this Hypothesis will not support us in asserting any
Beauty

Beauty Separate in Either. Or how say we? Is it not of Necessity so?

HIPPIAS.

So it appears.

SOCRATES.

Say we then that Both are beautiful, but deny that Each is so?

HIPPIAS.

What Reason is there to the Contrary?

SOCRATES.

This Reason, my Friend, as it seems to Me; because we had supposed certain Circumstances, attendant upon Things with This Condition, that, if they appertained to any Two Things, Both together, they appertained at the same time to Each; and, if they appertained to Each, that they appertained also to Both. Of this Kind are all such Circumstances and Attendants of Things, as were enumerated by You. Are they not?

HIPPIAS.

They are.

SOCRATES.

But Such Circumstances or Appendages of Being, as Those related by Me, are otherwise: and of this Kind are the being Each, and the being Both. Have not I stated the Case rightly?

HIPPIAS.

You have.

SOCRATES.

SOCRATES.

Under which Kind then, Hippias, do you rank the Beautiful? do you rank it among Those mentioned by your Self? as when you inferred, that if I was Well and Hearty, and You Well and Hearty, then Both of us were Well and Hearty: or if I was Honest and You Honest, then Both of us were Honest: or if we Both were so, it followed, that so was Each of us. Does the same Kind of Inference hold True in This Case? If I am Beautiful, and You are Beautiful, then Both of us are Beautiful; and if Both of us, then Each. Or is there no Reason, why it should not here be, as it is in ⁹⁷ Numbers? Two of which, taken together, may be Even; tho Each separately is perhaps Odd, perhaps Even; or, as it is in ⁹⁸ Magnitudes; where Two of

⁹⁷ For Instance; the Two *Odd* Numbers, Seven and Three, together make the *Even* Number, Ten: and the Two *Even* Numbers, Six and Four, make the very Same Number.

⁹⁸ For Instance; let there be supposed a Line, of Ten Inches in Length, measured by *whole Inches*: a Line of Three Inches $\frac{2}{3}$, and another Line of Two Inches $\frac{1}{4}$, are, Each of them, *Incommensurable* with the first given Line; because Neither of them can be measured completely by any Line so long as a *whole Inch*: yet Both together making Six Inches, they are *Commensurable* with the Line of Ten Inches, by the *Inch-Measure*. — It is the same with the *Powers* of Two Lines. The Power of Either may be *Incommensurable* with that of the Other, and also with some given Magnitude: yet the Power arising from Both may be *Commensurable* with that Third Magnitude. See *Euclid. Elem. Lib. 10. Prop. 35.* — To the present Purpose also is applicable the following Theorem. The Diameter of a Square is demonstrated by *Euclid (Elem. x. 97.)* to be *Incommensurable* with its

of them, tho Each is Incommensurable with some Third, yet Both together may perhaps be Commensurable with it, perhaps Incommensurable. A thousand such other Things there are, which I perceived, as I said, with great Clearness. Now, to Whether of these Two Orders of Being do you refer the Beautifull? Does the proper Rank of it appear as evident to You as it does to Me? For to Me it appears highly absurd, to suppose Both of us beautiful, yet Each of us not so; or Each of us beautiful, yet not so Both; no less absurd, than it is to suppose the same Kind of Difference between the Natures of Both and Each in any of the Cases put by You. Do you agree with Me then in ranking the Beautifull among These, or do you refer it to the Opposite Class of Things?

Hippias.

I intirely ⁹⁹ agree with You, Socrates.

Socrates.

You do well, Hippias: because we shall thus be freed from any farther Inquiry upon this Article. For, if the Beautifull be in that Class of Things, where We agree to place

its Side: And consequently so is a Line twice as long as the Diameter. Yet the Rectangular Space, comprehended by that Diameter and by a Line of twice its Length, is equal to a Square, whose Side is Commensurable with the Side of the given Square.

⁹⁹ In this, that the Peautifull belongs not to the Rank of Particulars, which are Infinite; but must be some Being *Universal*, running thro *All things*; communicating itself to All in various Measure, according to *its own Nature*; and thus introducing ORDER together with *Form*, not only into *Each Part*, but into the WHOLE OF THINGS.

place it, the Pleasant then, which ariseth in us thro Sight and Hearing, can no longer be supposed the Beautifull. Because That, which comes thro Both those Senses jointly, may make the Pleasures which arise from thence beautiful indeed Both taken together ; but cannot make Either of them so, ¹⁰⁰ considered as separate from the Other. But that the Beautifull

¹⁰⁰ In handling so accurately and dwelling so long upon this last and most important Disquisition, *concerning the Beauty of Things taken together, tho wanting in Beauty when considered Separate*, our Philosopher gives us an Opportunity of discovering perfectly wherein the Nature of Beauty consists, and of clearing up a considerable Difficulty relating to the most Consummate Beauty. For, tho it be impossible that any Two Things taken together should be beautiful when Each is not so, in all Cases where those Things are in their own Natures *absolutely Separate* ; yet we find it otherwise in the Nature of a *Whole and Parts*. A beautiful *Whole* may lose all its Beauty, when taken to *Pieces* ; and the *Parts* of it may have no Beauty, when considered *Separate* and without Reference to the *Whole*. — 'Tis so in the Structure of an *Animal* ; 'tis so in a *Ship, House, or City* ; 'tis so in the Frame of a *Civil State* : *Parts* may appear unhandsome, vile, or loathsome ; but they appear such only to the *Partial Eye* : to a *Mind, comprehending* all the *Parts* together, those which are vile, loathsome or unhandsome, appear, as they really are, fundamental to the Dignity, the Grace, and Beauty of the *Whole*. — So is it with That *most beautiful* of Things, *the World*. *Parts* of it may appear deformed, or disordered, in a *Partial View*, or with Reference to *Man* alone. But to that GREAT MIND, who comprehends it *All together*, and to every other Mind, so far as it partakes of the *Divine View*, it appears the *Copy*, as *Plato* calls it, of his own beautiful Ideas, the *Image of Himself*, of *Universal Beauty* ; or, in his other fine Metaphor, the *Expression in Relief*, the *Taking off*, as it were from *Engravings*, all the several *Genuses* and *Species* of *Things* ; the *Highest Genus*, where they all meet and are united, being MIND.

Beautifull should have fuch an Effect, or communicate itfelf in this Manner, is abfurd to fuppose ; as You and I have agreed, Hippias.

HIPPIAS.

We agreed it was fo, I own.

SOCRATES.

Tis impoffible therefore, that the Pleasant, arifing in us thro Sight and Hearing, fhould be the Beautifull ; becaufe from This Hypothefis an Abfurdity would follow.

HIPPIAS.

You have Reason on your Side.

SOCRATES.

“ Begin again then, and tell me, will He fay, for you
 “ have mift it now, What is that Beautifull, the Affociate
 “ of Both thefe Pleafures, for the Sake of which you give
 “ them the Preference to all Others, by honouring them
 “ with the Name of Beautifull.” It appears to Me, Hippias, neceffary for us to answer thus ; that ¹⁰¹ “ Thefe are
 “ of all Pleafures the moft innocent and good, as well
 “ Both of them taken together, as Each taken fingly.”
 Or can you tell me of any Circumftance befide, in which they differ from other Pleafures ?

HIPPIAS.

I know of None befide : For they are indeed the Beft of all.

SOCRATES.

¹⁰¹ See the latter Part of the *Philebus*.

SOCRATES.

“ This then, He will say, do you now maintain to be
 “ the Beautifull, Pleasure Profitable ? ” — “ Tis so, in my
 “ Opinion,” I shall answer. — What Answer would you
 make ?

HIPPIAS.

The Same.

SOCRATES.

“ Well then, will He say ; the Profitable, you know,
 “ is That which is the Efficient of Good. And the Effi-
 “ cient, as we agreed lately, is a Thing different from
 “ the Effect. Our Reasoning therefore has brought us
 “ round to the same Point again : for thus neither would
 “ the Good be Beautifull, nor would the Beautifull be
 “ Good ; Each of these being, upon this Hypothesis, dif-
 “ ferent from the Other.” — “ Most evidently so ; ” is the
 Answer we must make, Hippias, if we are of Sound Mind.
 For the Sacredness of Truth will never suffer us to oppose
 the Man, who has Truth with him on his Side.

HIPPIAS.

But now, Socrates, What think you all these Matters
 are, which we have been disputing about ? They are the
 Shreds and Tatters of an Argument, cut and torn, as I
 said before, into a thousand Pieces. But the Thing, which
 is Beautiful, as well as highly Valuable, is This ; to be
 able to exhibit a fine Speech, in a becoming and handsome
 Manner, before the Council, or Court of Justice, or any

Q 2

other

other Assembly or Person in Authority, to whom the Speech is addressed. Such a Speech, as hath the Power of Persuasion; and having ended, to depart, not with ¹⁰² mean and insignificant Trophies of Victory, but with a Prize the noblest, the Preservation of our Selves, our Fortunes, and our Friends. This you ought to be ambitious of, and bid Adieu to such petty and paltry Disputes; or you will appear as if you had quite lost your Senses, playing with Straws and Trifles, as you have been now doing.

SOCRATES.

O Friend Hippias! You are happy, that you know what Course of Life 'tis best for a Man to follow, and have followed it, according to your own Account, so successfully your Self. But I—seem fated to be under the Power of some ¹⁰³ Divine Spirit, who keeps me wandering continually

¹⁰² Meaning the Applause of his Disciples and Friends, who were then about him, as usual with them in Public Places; and who were never better pleased, than when the Philosopher exposed the Ignorance of the Sophists. They were now, it seems, giving Marks of Pleasure and Approbation: and *Hippias* discovers his secret Chagrin upon the Occasion, tho at the same time he affects to despise it.

¹⁰³ The Words of *Plato* in this Place are *δαίμονία τις τύχη*: in which it is observable that he varies from his usual Expression *θεῖα τύχη*, or *θεῖα μοῖρα*, in other Places, where his *general* Meaning is the same as it is here: for the Explication of which we refer to our Notes near the Conclusion of the *Meno*. The Variation here has in it great Propriety and Beauty. For *Socrates* disclaimed all Pretences to the Possession of Wisdom, which, he says in the *Banquet*, belongs to None but the Gods; and professed only *Philosophy*, or the Love of Wisdom: and This, he tells us in the same excellent Speech, belongs to the φύσις
δαί-

ally in Search of Truth, and still at a Loss where to find it. And whenever I lay my Difficultys and Perplexitys before You Wise Men, I meet with no other Answer from you than Contumely and Reproach. For you All tell me the same Thing, which You tell me now, “ that I busy my
 “ self about silly, minute, and insignificant Matters.”— On the other hand, when, upon giving Credit to what you All tell me, I say, as You do; “ that to be able to ex-
 “ hibit a fine Speech in a Court of Justice or any other
 “ Assembly, and to go thro it in a proper and handsome
 “ Manner, is the finest Thing in the World; and that no
 “ Employment is so beautiful, or so well becomes a Man;” I then meet with Censure and Obloquy from ¹⁰⁴ Some who are here present, but especially from That Man who is always ¹⁰⁵ reproving me. For He is my ¹⁰⁶ Nearest of Kin, and lives with me in the same House. So, whenever I

return

δαίμονία, the *Middle Nature* between the *Human* and the *Divine*. Agreeably to which he here intimates, that to Himself was particularly allotted the *Philosophic* and *Inquisitive Genius*; That *intermediate Principle*, which in a *Human Way* leads to the Discovery of *Truth*.

¹⁰⁴ Meaning his Philosophic Friends.

¹⁰⁵ See Note 36.

¹⁰⁶ Those, who are acquainted with the Doctrine of *Socrates* and his Disciples, will easily perceive, that the Drift of *Plato* in this Place is to insinuate to his Readers, how *near* the *Alliance* is, and how *close* the *Connection*, between the *Human* and *Divine* Natures. But we beg Leave to observe farther, with what admirable Art and Address such an Insinuation is introduced, near the Conclusion of this Inquiry concerning the *Beautifull its Self*; as it is designed purposely to shew, how *nearly* Man is *interested* in the Inquiry, and *where* it is that he must inquire and learn.

return Home, and am entered in, as soon as he hears me talking in this Strain, he asks me, if I am not ashamed to pronounce, with so much Confidence, what Professions and Employments are fine, or beautiful, or becoming; when I have plainly shewn my self so ignorant with regard to Things Beautiful, as not to know wherein the Nature of Beauty consists. — “ And how can You judge, says He, “ Who has spoken a beautiful or fine Speech, or done any “ thing else, in a handsome Manner, and Who not; ignorant as you are What the Beautifull and Handsome is? “ Such then being the ¹⁰⁷ Disposition of your Mind, is it “ possible that you can think Life more eligible to You “ than Death?”—Thus have I had the ill Fortune, as I told you, to suffer Obloquy and Reproach from You, to suffer Obloquy also and Reproach from Him. But perhaps it is necessary to endure All This. If I have received Benefit or Improvement from it, there is no Harm done. And, I seem to my self, Hippias, improved and benefited by the Conversation of you Both. For the Meaning of the

¹⁰⁷ The Disposition of Mind, here meant by *Socrates*, is that, which is represented in this Dialogue under the *Character* of *Hippias*. But in the *First Alcibiades* we are told, in a more plain and open Manner, that ‘tis “ a Readiness to decide dogmatically, and pronounce peremptorily, “ What is Honest or Dishonest, Beautiful or Base, Good or Evil; attended with an Ignorance in the Nature of *the Honest, the Beautifull, “ and the Good*: and these being Things of *highest Moment*, a Man “ with such a Mind is liable every Instant to commit *Capital Errors*, “ and to run eagerly into *Extreme Evil*.”

the Proverb, ¹⁰⁸ “ Things of Beauty are Things of Diffi-
 “ culty,” if I am not mistaken in my Self, I know.

¹⁰⁸ *Plato* ends this exquisitely subtle Dialogue with pointing out the *Use* of it ; the Things, to which he here means to apply the Proverb, being *Wisdom* and *true Virtue*. For these, according to his Doctrine in the *Banquet*, are the *Result* of That, which he there says is so arduous to attain, *a thorow and perfect View of THE SOVEREIGN BEAUTY*.

The Reader is desired to correct the following Errors ; and any other, which may have escaped our Observation :


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|--|---|
| Page 44. in the Text, Line the last, instead of <i>Apemantus</i> read <i>Apemantes</i> . | Page 70. in the Note, Line 3. instead of <i>any more</i> , read <i>Beauty</i> . |
| Page 43. in the Notes, Line 12. instead of <i>were</i> read <i>was</i> . | Page 77. in the Notes, Line 2. blot out <i>the</i> before the Word <i>freeing</i> . |
| Page 62. in the Notes, last Line but One, read <i>ἀμφίστοιός τις ἦν.</i> | Page 81. in the Notes, the last Word read <i>εἶναι</i> |
| | Page 105. in the Notes, instead of 114, read 115. |

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